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This study is about discovering to what extent China uses its rare earth element 
policies as a tool of economic statecraft. With China’s virtual monopoly on this 
resource and the United States’ increasingly growing demand, it is necessary to 
examine how China intends on using its economic power. The study builds a 
comparative framework using both structural realism and neoliberal 
institutionalism, by identifying theory predictions in terms of China’s strategic 
intent and the specific policies it might employ in the rare earth element sector. 
Specifically, the study finds that Beijing has and will continue to use its rare earth 
policies as a tool of economic statecraft, but with restraint. Despite its present 
reliance on economic interdependence with the United States, as China 
continues to modernize the structure of its economy, more statecraft 
interventions will likely occur. Beijing was successful in utilizing its rare earth 
policies as a tool of economic statecraft both by influencing the behavior of its 
international and its domestic commercial actors. China will leverage its near-
monopoly on the rare earths industry by continuing to aggressively employ 
policies that meet its long-term strategic objectives. 
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I. THESIS OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION: 
This thesis will evaluate how China has managed its rare earth element 
(REE) policies since its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001, a period in which China rapidly accelerated its integration with the global 
economy and sustained unprecedented growth. Specifically, this study will 
attempt to answer the question as to what extent China is using its REE policies 
as a tool of economic statecraft. In an effort to identify China’s true policy 
orientation on rare earths, an assessment framework will be constructed through 
the lens of two principal international relations schools of thought: structural 
realism and neoliberal institutionalism. By highlighting the basic theory 
predictions of these theories as to how we would expect China to behave 
relevant to its rare earth policies, I aim to assess whether China is indeed 
implementing policies in the mineral sector as a tool of economic statecraft.  The 
analysis will continue with three illustrative stories detailing China’s policies 
affiliated with rare earths. Finally, the study will conclude by addressing the 
strategic implications for the United States and attempt to provide some 
perspective on the important question of what type of rising power China will be.  
B. IMPORTANCE: 
How China will use its economic power after more than three decades of 
unprecedented growth remains among the most critical subjects in contemporary 
international relations. As mentioned above, this study focuses specifically on 
China’s REE policies and attempts to assess whether or not those policies are 
being utilized as a tool for economic statecraft. As evident towards the beginning 
of the 21st century, China’s policies associated with the rare earths market (e.g., 
resource quotas, export tariffs) have brought tremendous attention and concern 
throughout the international system. In particular, recent Chinese rare earth 
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policies have instigated much apprehension for China’s largest economic rival, 
the United States.  
Why have rare earths taken on such importance? China controls 
approximately 97% of the world’s REE market. These rare earths, which are not 
widely known because they are so low on the production chain, are essential to 
hundreds of high tech devices, many of which define our modern way of life. 
Without REEs, much of the world’s modern technology would be incredibly 
different and a large degree of applications would not be feasible. We would not 
have the capability to utilize smaller-sized technology, such as laptop computers 
and cellular phones, without the use of rare earth elements.1 In today’s modern 
era, there are also important defense applications such as jet fighter engines, 
missile guidance systems, anti-missile defense, space-based satellites and 
communication systems.2 Moreover, REEs are fundamental to the development 
of green technology such as the latest generation of wind-powered turbines, 
plug-in hybrid vehicles, and oil refineries, where they serve as catalysts.3 
World demand for rare earths was estimated at 136,100 metric tons in 
2010, with global production around 133,600 metric tons annually. The gap is 
covered by above ground stocks or inventories. According to the Industrial 
Minerals Company of Australia, (IMCOA) global demand for REEs will be 
185,000 metric tons in 2015. China’s production levels may reach 140,000 metric 
tons per year in 2015 as China’s annual demand is assessed to rise to 111,000 
metric tons. The Chinese Rare Earth Industry Association, however, estimates 
China’s demand to increase to 130,000 metric tons by 2015. That said, the non-
                                            
1 Cindy Hurst, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) (March 2010). 
2 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Rare Earth Elements: The 
Global Supply Chain, by Marc Humphries, CRS Report R41347 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, September 6, 2011). 
3 Hurst, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) (March 2010). 
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China annual production would need to be between 45,00 metric tons to 70,000 
metric tons in order to meet the global demand for REEs.4 
With China producing 97% of the world’s REEs and continuing to impose 
quota restrictions and export tariffs, the United States arguably has a legitimate 
reason for concern.5 According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), 
the United States obtains its REE raw materials from foreign sources, almost 
exclusively from China. Similarly, import dependence upon a single country 
raises serious issues of supply security.6  As for assessing the United States’ 
vulnerability to mineral-supply disruptions, any shortage of the rare earth element 
barite would be significant as this rare earth is critical to the U.S. oil and gas 
industry.7 But even beyond the oil and gas industries, which account for the 
largest percentage of United States REE demand, many scientific organizations 
have concluded that certain rare earth elements are critical to United States 
national security and are becoming increasingly more important in defense 
applications.8  Take for instance the REE dysprosium and terbium. Both of these 
REEs are essential in fabricating permanent magnets that are crucial 
components in many military weapon systems. Unfortunately a lack of production 
capability remains a vulnerability for the United States as these two REEs are 
currently only available from China.9  Although United States domestic reserves 
and inferred resources of REEs are approximately 1.5 million metric tons, its hard 
to estimate how much of that reserve and resource will be economically 
                                            
4 U.S. Library of Congress, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,” 3–4. 
5 Ibid., 13. 
6 Keith R. Long, “The Principal Rare Earth Elements Deposits of the United States – A 
Summary of Domestic Deposits and a Global Perspective,” United States Geological Survey, 
November 16, 2010, http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2010/5220/. 
7 Ibid., 18. 
8 U.S. Library of Congress, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,” 8. 
9 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Rare Earth Elements in 
National Defense: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Valerie B. 
Grasso, CRS Report R41744. (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, March 31, 2011). 
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available, when and at what rate. The United States currently has a 
preponderance of light rare earths while lacking sufficient domestic heavy rare 
earths. As the pipeline of new rare earth projects within the United States is 
rather low, with 10 out of 150 REE exploration projects identified worldwide, the 
United States must increasingly look to foreign sources such as China for its 
critical supply.10 
As for China, its continued economic growth and increased consumer 
demand has prompted more of its domestic REEs to remain in country. China 
wants an expanded and fully integrated REE industry where exports of value 
added materials are preferred. China’s goal is to build-out and serve its domestic 
manufacturing industry and lure foreign investors to partake by positioning 
foreign-owned facilities in China in exchange for access to rare earths as well as 
access to the developing Chinese market. Additionally, safety and environmental 
factors will likely raise the cost of operations in China’s rare earth industry as 
domestic consumption is becoming a priority for China.11   
By specifying not only the importance behind this natural resource but also 
the degree to which China is using this sector as a tool of economic statecraft, 
this study will expand general knowledge of China’s economic conduct. In the 
context of Chinese contemporary strategic studies, this study also offers insight 
into the economic dimension of China’s international relations.12 Identifying 
China’s goals and strategic intent in this inductive manner will enable us to draw 
conclusions as to what the United States should do, strategically, if anything at 
all, and it gets to the question of what type of rising power China will be.  
                                            
10 Keith R. Long, “The Principal Rare Earth Elements Deposits of the United States.” 
11 U.S. Library of Congress, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,” 17. 
12 William J. Norris, “Economic Statecraft with Chinese Characteristics: The Use of 
Commercial Actors in China’s Grand Strategy” (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, September 2010). 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES: 
This thesis will apply the lenses of the two prominent international 
relations theories (structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism) in an attempt 
to frame China’s policies and the extent of economic statecraft in the rare earth 
element sector. Despite there being a considerable volume of literature in both 
the international political economy and international relations fields on these two 
schools of thought, actual examples of how these two theories impact the metals 
industry, specifically rare earth policies are rare. Consequently, this study will 
utilize these theories to evaluate the strategic consequences of China’s behavior 
in REEs.  
Are China’s REE policies being implemented such that other actors 
including the United States are compelled to behave in a specified manner or do 
China’s actions foster co-operative relations?  Structural realism suggests that 
China would act in the pursuit of relative gains and implement policies of 
economic statecraft in a sector in which they enjoy such leverage; neoliberal 
institutionalism predicts a more interdependent picture of China’s policies as it 
pursues absolute gains. Both theories are feasible; however, only one theory 
truly explains the actions China has initiated recently surrounding its REE 
policies with the United States. As such, this study will further examine these two 
main theories and attempt to characterize China’s recent rare earth element 
policy actions. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES: 
In this study, I develop a comparative framework to access China’s REE 
behavior on the basis of structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism, by 
laying out what each theory would expect us to predict in terms of China’s 
strategic intent and the specific policies it might employ in the REE sector. I apply 
this assessment framework to different aspects of China’s REE behavior and 
conclude, on balance, that China is indeed employing an economic statecraft 
approach to the sector. This empirical assessment of Chinese economic 
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behavior is supplemented by three illustrative stories of specific incidents/policies 
in the sector. The goal of this thesis is to answer the question of whether China is 
employing its REE policies as a tool of economic statecraft. The overall process 
described above does so by building an analytical narrative of China’s REE 
policies through qualitative comparative analysis. 
Beginning with a comprehensive literature review, this study will test the 
above hypothesis by highlighting evidence from the international media, trade 
press, academia, think tanks and Chinese and U.S. government reports.13 
Specifically, U.S. government reports will provide factual material for all three 
illustrative stories, although some critical reports will offer substantive content. 
For instance, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) authors, Wayne M. 
Morrison and Rachel Tang, have written abundantly about REEs and 
consequently are identified as authoritative sources throughout this study. 
E. THESIS OUTLINE: 
This study is organized into five distinct chapters. Chapter I offers a 
general overview of the thesis including the overall importance of the study, 
hypotheses used, as well as sources and methods prescribed.  
Chapter II covers Chinese REEs and provides a detailed description of 
China’s rare earth sector. The intent of this chapter is designed primarily to give 
the reader a basic overview of rare earths and highlight their growing importance 
to the international community.  
Chapter III’s main focus is to provide basic international relations theory 
predictions that characterize China’s behavior associated with rare earths as well 
                                            
13 Examples of international media, trade press, think tanks, academic, Chinese, and United 
States government sources for the Sino-United States case are: Keith Bradsher, “China is 
Blocking Minerals, Executives Say,” The New York Times, September 24, 2010; R. Colin 
Johnson, “Rare Earths Get Rarer, “Electronic Engineering Times,” August 15, 2011; Cindy A. 
Hurst, “China’s Rare Earth Industry: What Can the West Learn?” Washington, D.C., Institute for 
the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), March 2010; Robert Looney, “Recent Developments of a 
New Technocratic Mercantilism Emerging in China?” World Economics 12:1 (2011): 71; Marc 
U.S. Library of Congress, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,” Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), September 6, 2011. 
 7
as offer likely U.S. policy responses. By accurately defining both theories 
(structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism) and using each as a basic 
framework to predict China’s rare earth policy actions, we can better measure the 
extent to which China is using its policies as a tool of economic statecraft. Also 
embedded within this chapter are key definitions, concepts, and terms that assist 
the reader in understanding the nuances behind economic statecraft and 
interdependence. The chapter concludes by addressing both the interactions 
between the Chinese government and its industry while also supplementing the 
economic statecraft perspective by articulating what the efficient tools of 
statecraft would be in the sector. 
Chapter IV opens by laying out a comparative assessment of China’s REE 
policies on the basis of two international relations theory predictions. The second 
half of the chapter supplements the comparative assessment by highlighting 
three illustrious stories containing specific policies relevant to the rare earth 
industry. The first illustrative story and arguably the most important involves 
China’s halt on rare earth shipments to Japan in response to a 2010 maritime 
incident that occurred in contested waters of the East China Sea. This story is 
clearly an example of China’s ability to leverage its soft power capabilities, 
particularly economic activities, in order to achieve Chinese strategic interests.  
The second example chosen also encompasses both China and Japan; 
however, in this example China is taking advantage of its economic power and 
utilizing its rare earth policies to compel Japan to move its production facilities to 
China in order to attain new technological developments. Nevertheless, in either 
case, these examples clearly illustrate China’s utilization of significant economic 
power coupled with an ability to direct its economic might toward an international 
actor to attain a strategic objective. The third and final story also exhibits 
economic statecraft; however, in this specific example China’s rare earth policy 
affects Chinese domestic corporations. With Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) exercising rare earth policies that focus on consolidation, the state is able 
to garner substantial economic power and attain long-term strategic goals.  
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Chapter V concludes the study by offering an overall conclusion, details 
the various strategic implications for the United States and offers some insight as 
to what type of rising power China will be. 
This thesis has four key findings. First, although Beijing has and will 
continue to utilize its rare earth policies as a tool of economic statecraft, it will do 
so rather cautiously. To be sure, China’s capabilities in economic power are 
continually expanding along with its effectiveness in choosing from a vast array 
of economic statecraft policy options; however, its present reliance on economic 
interdependence with the United States often checks its leverage in exercising 
economic power. Nevertheless, as China continues to modernize the structure of 
its economy by transforming the country to a dominant center of innovation, more 
coercive measures will likely occur.  
Second, Beijing has been successful in utilizing its rare earth policies as a 
tool of economic statecraft not only by influencing the behavior of international 
actors but also through deliberate interaction with its domestic commercial 
actors. As evident in two of the three aforementioned illustrative stories, China 
was effective in leveraging its rare earth policies as a tool of economic statecraft 
against Japan and arguably the U.S. Similarly, story three reveals Beijing’s ability 
to manipulate the economic activities of its domestic industrial partners. 
Specifically, the Chinese government has leveraged its economic power by 
imposing rare earth policies against both private rare earth firms and SOEs. 
Third, although Beijing clearly desires deeper integration with the global 
economy through the continual use of rare earth policies, this will not be at the 
expense of losing any control within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).14  This 
finding is predicated primarily on the fact that China is moving toward a rare earth 
industry that is consolidated under principally state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
Finally, despite the many conditions for determining China’s effectiveness 
in economic statecraft, the ability of the Chinese government to structure its REE 
                                            
14 Norris, “Economic Statecraft with Chinese Characteristics,” 35. 
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sector and direct its domestic enterprises (i.e., both SOEs and private 
corporations) is especially significant. Unlike many other developing countries, 
China is unique in that its domestic economies are organized via a series of 
government-business relations. And more often than not, it is the nature of 
China’s domestic relationships that dictate the magnitude by which Beijing has 
control over its economic interaction with the United States.15 Thus, in the end, 
when China maintains more control over its domestic economy, it will be fare 
more likely to attain success in its efforts to engage in economic statecraft 
internationally. 
 
                                            
15  Ibid., 67. 
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II. RARE EARTH ELEMENTS OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
China produces 97% of the world’s rare earth elements (REEs), an 
essential component in a vast array of advanced civilian and military capabilities.  
Increasing global demand coupled with recent Chinese aggressive policy 
measures have led to international concerns surrounding future supply 
shortages. Despite current United States initiatives to develop alternative sources 
for rare earths, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has stated that it 
could take over a decade before the United States is capable of rebuilding its 
U.S. sourced rare earth supply chain.  Furthermore, China’s monopoly over rare 
earths has prompted apprehension of China using its policies as leverage to 
influence the United States’ foreign policies.16 
This chapter is designed to give the reader a basic overview of what REEs 
are and their growing importance to the United States. The material represented 
will also explore a brief history of rare earths paying particular attention to China 
and its trade with the United States. 
B. WHAT ARE RARE EARTH ELEMENTS? 
According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), there are 17 rare earth 
elements (REEs), 15 within the chemical group called lanthanides, plus yttrium 
and scandium.17  Despite the name, rare earths are not “rare.”  Rather, they are 
moderately abundant in the earth’s crust. In the same instance, however, they 
are dispersed and are typically found mixed together in other deposits, which 
make it challenging to find rare earths in a concentration significant enough to 
mine and process economically. When rare earths are extracted from the earth, 
the ore containing the rare earths must go through a series of complex 
                                            
16 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China’s Rare Earths Industry 
and its Role in the Internaitonal Market (November 2010). 
17 U.S. Library of Congress, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,” 1. 
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separation processes to produce each individual element. Although there are 
other costs connected to rare earths, it is the separation process that largely 
dictates the cost of rare earth production.18   
Although rare earths can be found in a variety of minerals, the most 
prevalent REEs are found primarily in bastnaesite and monazite. Bastnaesite 
generally contains the light rare earths and a small amount of the heavy earths, 
while monazite also contains mostly light earths, but the percentage of heavy 
earths is two to three times larger. According to USGS, bastnaesite deposits in 
China and the United States comprise the most significant quantity of rare earth 
resources. Monazite deposits consist of the second largest segment while these 
are found in Australia, Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, and the United States. Other instances of minerals that are known to 
contain rare earths include secondary monazite, ion absorption clays, spent 
uranium solutions, xenotime, apatite, cheralite, eudialyte, loparite, and 
phoshporites.19 
REEs are separated into two categories, light rare earths and heavy rare 
earths. The light rare earths, which are more prevalent, consist of lanthanum 
through europium (atomic numbers 57-63) while the heavy rare earths, less 
predominant than light earths and generally used in high-tech applications, 
contain gadolinium through lutetium (atomic numbers 64-71). Yttruim is generally 
classified as a heavy rare earth.20   
C. MAJOR END USES AND APPLICATIONS 
Rare earths are used in a variety of applications and can be found in a 
multitude of industries. Within the oil industry, rare earths are used in petroleum 
                                            
18 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, China’s Rare Earth Industry 
and Export Regime: Economic and Trade Implications for the United States, by Wayne M. 
Morrison and Rachel Tang, CRS Report R42510 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, April 30, 2012). 
19 Hurst, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) (March 2010). 
20 U.S. Library of Congress, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,” 2. 
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refining and as diesel additives; rare earths are crucial to the automotive industry 
due to their wide application in motors, generators, catalytic converters and 
hybrid vehicle batteries; they are utilized in the electronics industry to produce 
mobile phones cameras and computer disk drives; and these elements are used 
in powerful magnets in wind-power turbines. (See Figure 1.) 
While rare earth applications in high-tech devices have existed for 
decades, it is their application in the defense industry and clean energy 
technologies that has attracted the world’s immense demand for rare earths.21  
DOD estimates that the United States uses about 5% of the world’s supply of 
rare earths for defense purposes. Rare earths are used in two types of 
commercially available permanent magnet materials: samarium cobalt (SmCo) 
and neodymium iron boron (NdFeB). NdFeB magnets, known to be the world’s 
strongest permanent magnets, monopolize rare earth magnet usage in the 
defense industry and are a vital component to several military weapon systems. 
Similarly, SmCo is essential for military technologies as this rare earth has the 
capability to retain its magnetic strength at high temperatures. These rare earths 
are often used in the following defense applications: precision-guided missiles, 
smart bombs, aircraft engines and many others.22 
                                            
21 Wayne and Tang, “China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime,” 3. 
22 Grasso, “Rare Earth Elements in National Defense,” 3. 
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Source: Molycorp Inc. company website (http://www.molycorp.com), accessed February 21, 2012. 
Figure 1.  Applications of Rare Earths 
D. PRODUCTION PROCESS AND WORLDWIDE PRODUCTION LEVELS 
According to Government Accountability Office (GAO) figures, China 
accounts for the following in world production of rare earths: 
 97% of rare earth ore 
 97% of rare earth oxides 
 89% of rare earth alloys 
 75% of NdFeB magnets 
 60% of SmCo magnets 
The rare earth production process consists of the following five stages: 
mining, separating, refining, alloying, and manufacturing rare earths into value-
added, end-use products.  
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The first stage is comprised of excavating the ore from the ground 
The second stage involves separating the ore into individual rare earth 
oxides. 
The third stage entails refining the rare earth oxides into metals; oxides 
can be dried, stored, and shipped for further processing into metals. 
The fourth stage involves forming metals into alloys. 
The fifth and final stage is manufacturing the alloys into individual 
products, such as permanent magnets.23 
As for world production levels, China holds a near-monopoly on rare 
earths, with 97% (130,000 metric tons). However, rare earth reserves and the 
reserve base are more scattered throughout the world. As indicated by the 
USGS, China holds 50% of the world’s rare earth reserves while the United 
States holds approximately 13%. South Africa and Canada (included in the 
“other” category) have substantial reserve potential with Russia, India, Australia, 










                                            
23 Ibid., 7. 
24 U.S. Library of Congress, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,” 9. 
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Table 1.   Rare Earth Elements: World Production and Reserves - 2010 
 
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior, Mineral Commodity Summaries, USGS, 2010. 
a. Reserve Base is defined by the USGS to include reserves (both economic and marginally 
economic) plus some subeconomic resources (i.e., those that may have potential for becoming 
economic reserves). 
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Source: U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2008-2011. (Figure created by CRS.) 
Figure 2.  Rare Earth Elements: World Production,  
Reserves and U.S. Imports 
E. CHINA’S RARE EARTH RESOURCES 
Throughout the world, there are three known and confirmed locations 
where abundant concentrations of rare earth resources exist: Baiyun Obo of 
Inner Mongolia, China; Mountain Pass, California, where Molycorp’s mine is 
located and has returned to production; and Mt. Weld, Australia, which is known 
to be rich in deposits but still requires the necessary infrastructure to begin 
mining, separation and transport to a viable market.25 
                                            
25 Morrison and Tang, “China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime,” 8. 
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China is rich in rare earth resources and, as noted by the USGS, has half 
of the world’s total rare earth reserves. Known in China as “industrial vitamins,”26 
a plethora of rare earth deposits were discovered in over 20 provinces and 
autonomous regions within China. China’s largest rare earth reserve, Baiyun Obo 
(also known as Bayan Obo), is located in the Chinese autonomous region of 
Inner Mongolia, holds over 83% of China’s rare earth reserves and accounts for 
about 50% of all rare earths output in China. China’s other regions with large rare 
earth reserves are Shandong (7.7%), Sichuan (3%), and a number of provinces 
in southern China (3%). (See Figure 3.) Additionally, it is important to note that 
the rare earth deposits concentrated within northern China are principally light 
rare earths (LREEs) while the few and highly sought-after heavy rare earths 
(HREEs) are located in southern China, particularly in Jiangxi, Guangdong, 
Fujian, Guangxi, and Hunan provinces. As it stands now, China is the only 
country in the world that can provide significant quantities of both light and heavy 
rare earth elements. Mountain Pass mine in California and the Mt. Weld mine in 












                                            
26 Pui-Kwan Tse, U.S. Geological Survey (2011) quoted in Wayne M. Morrison and Rachel 
Tang, “China's Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime: Economic and Trade Implications for the 
United States,” Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2012, 8. 
27 Morrison and Tang, “China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime,” 8–9. 
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Source: Plans for Developing the Rare Earth Industry 2009-2015. 
Note: Map prepared by Congressional Research Service (CRS). 
Figure 3.  Rare Earth Reserves in China 
F. HISTORY OF THE RARE EARTHS INDUSTRY 
While there is no disputing that China dominates the rare earth production 
market today, the United States was once the world leader in rare earth 
production and innovation. Up until the 1980s, the United States was the number 
one producer and technological innovator for REEs in the world, with the 
overwhelming majority of mining taking place at the Mountain Pass production 
facility in southwestern California.  In 1984, the Mountain Pass mine accounted 
for the entire U.S. domestic demand and one-third of all global exports of 
REEs.28 
Levkowitz provides an authoritative account of China’s rare earth industry. 
He notes that as the United States was the leader of the rare earth market, 
leaders in Beijing began to realize China’s potential to exploit its own resourceful 
rare earth reserves.  On his tour of southern China in 1992, Deng Xiaoping, then 
                                            
28 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China’s Rare Earths Industry 
and its Role in the International Market (November 2010). 
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the leader of China’s Communist Party (CCP), voiced the strategic value of the 
country’s enormous rare earth reserves when he declared, “There is oil in the 
Middle East and rare earth in China.”29 Towards the end of the 1970s, China’s 
production capabilities significantly improved due to increased government 
support for developing enhanced mining techniques as well as new research and 
development (R&D) efforts for rare earth applications. These new initiatives gave 
China a 40% average increase in rare earth production annually between 1978 
and 1989, making it a dominant world producer. Like today, the majority of 
China’s rare earth mining has centered around China’s Bayan Obo mine in 
Baotou, Inner Mongolia.30 
During China’s initial stages of its domestic rare earth production 
endeavors, many Chinese rare earth mining enterprises were not in the least 
profitable; however, many companies were able to continue operations with the 
aid of non-performing loans and other subsidies given to them from Chinese 
government-controlled banks. Levkowitz points out that this assistance enabled 
Chinese rare earth mining facilities to produce at low prices, thereby elevating 
the overall number of exports of rare earths. As a result of these increasing 
exports throughout the 1990s, global prices plummeted which in-turn drove non-
Chinese producers (i.e., United States) out of business. The California based 
Mountain Pass mine facility was closed in 2002 largely driven by lower-priced 
competition from Chinese companies. In the end, it left the United States 
completely dependent on China for its domestic rare earths consumption.31   
Levkowitz goes on to point out that with the mining of rare earths migrating 
from the United States to China, so did the production of rare earth oxides, alloys 
and permanent magnets used in the commercial and military industries. 
                                            
29 Richard Stone, “As China's Rare Earth R&D Becomes Ever More Rarefied, Others 
Tremble,” Science 325 (September 2009): 1336. 
30 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China's Rare Earths Industry and 
its Role in the International Market (November 2010). 
31 Ibid., 2. 
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Moreover, the relocation of production to China has also resulted in the United 
States relinquishing its position as the leading country for research and 
development in rare earth technologies. As noted by rare earth industry 
consultant Jack Lifton, even if the United States were able to begin rare earth 
mining immediately, the degradation of technical expertise would leave U.S. 
producers incapable of effectively refining rare earths into any functional 
components. Furthermore, the shortage of experienced researchers would 
greatly impede any commercial and/or military innovation in rare earth 
products.32 
G. ESTIMATED FUTURE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR RARE EARTHS 
Chinese domestic demand for rare earths has increasingly grown along 
side China’s economy as well as its increased production in technology that 
require rare earths. In the early years, China’s production capacity of rare earths 
was able to satisfy both domestic and global requirements; however, now 
analysts assess that China’s domestic demand for rare earths will soon meet, if 
not exceed, its domestic supply.33  
Hurst uses a number of examples to illustrate China’s anticipated increase 
in rare earth consumption.34 For instance, in July of 2008, China had 600 million 
mobile phone users; by March of 2009, less than one year later, China had 670 
million users. This trend will likely increase as new technologies continue to 
develop. Other examples of increased domestic demand for rare earths involve 
the energy industry. In China, both solar and wind power are expected to 
increase substantially in the near future. It is estimated that green energy 
technology is expected to become the largest consumer of rare earths. In China’s 
2007 energy strategy, the government had a target of 30 gigawatts capacity for 
wind-power; however, according to Fang Junshi, head of the coal department of 
                                            
32 Ibid., 2. 
33 Ibid., 6. 
34 Hurst, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), 19. 
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the National Energy Administration, China will have 100 gigawatts of wind-power 
by 2020. China’s consumption of rare earths are also expected to increase due 
as more foreign companies (i.e., United States) move their production facilities to 
China to take advantage of lower cost rare earths.35 
 The rest of the world, too, will continue to consume rare earths in larger 
quantities especially as countries recover from the recent global financial crisis 
and continue to develop and use high-tech products.36 World demand for REEs 
was estimated at 136,100 metric tons in 2010, with global production around 
133,600 metric tons. The gap is covered by above ground stock. According to the 
Industrial Minerals Company of Australia (IMCOA), global demand for rare earths 
will be 185,000 metric tons in 2015.  China’s production levels may reach 
140,000 metric tons per year in 2015 as China’s annual demand is assessed to 
rise to 111,000 metric tons. The Chinese Rare Earth Industry Association, 
however, estimates China’s demand to increase to 130,000 metric tons by 2015. 
That said, the non-China annual output would need to be between 45,000–
70,000 metric tons in order to meet the global demand for rare earths. Although 
the gap in global demand may be mitigated by new mine production for some 
light rare earths (i.e., excess supply of cerium, lanthanum, and praseodymium), 
several predictions show that there will likely be shortages of other light rare 
earths and many heavy rare earths (i.e., dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, 
europium and erbium).37 
Like China, as world demand continues to increase, U.S. demand for rare 
earths is also estimated to rise. For instance, permanent magnet demand is 
assessed to grow by 10-16% per year over the next several years while the 
demand in auto catalysts and petroleum catalysts is expected to grow 6% and 
 
                                            
35 Ibid., 19-20. 
36 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China’s Rare Earths Industry 
and its Role in the International Market (November 2010). 
37 U.S. Library of Congress, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,” 3–4. 
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8%, respectively.  Likewise, demand for rare earths in hybrid vehicle engines, 
defense, medical and flat panel displays are also expected to increase.38       
(See Figure 4.) 
 
 
Source: IMCOA, 2011 
Note: Figure created by CRS. 
 
Figure 4.  Rare Earth Demand by Application-U.S. and World, 2015 
H. U.S. - CHINA RARE EARTH TRADE 
As a result of a decade of open free-market trade and non-stringent 
environmental and safety regulations, China has become the world’s dominant 
producer, user, and exporter of rare earths. In fact, as of 2011, China’s trade 
data indicated that the value of its rare earth exports reached $3.4 billion. As 
noted by the USGS, China currently accounts for an estimated 97.3% of global 
mine production of rare earths with many countries including the United States 
becoming increasingly dependent on China for all varieties of rare earth 
materials. According to the United States International Trade Commission 
(USITC), the value of U.S. rare earth imports from the world reached $860 million 
in 2011 (up from $94 million in 2002). But more importantly, the value of U.S. 
rare earth imports from China in 2011 totaled $523 million. It is worth noting that 
                                            
38 Ibid., 4. 
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the value of U.S. rare earth imports from China rose by 1,376% between 2002–
2011. When measured by quantity, the U.S. dependence on China for its rare 
earths is important. Over the past decade (2002-2011), the amount of U.S. rare 
earth imports from China as a percentage of the total U.S. rare earths imported 
averaged 78.3%.39 
In recent years, however, the quantity of U.S. rare earth imports from 
China has dropped dramatically. In fact, between 2006 and 2011 U.S. imports 
from China declined from a high of 24,513 metric tons to 6,884 metric tons 
(71.9% drop). (See Figure 5.) This drop in U.S. rare earth imports was not only 
attributable to the after effects of the global economic slowdown, but also the 
rising prices of imported Chinese rare earths. Over the last decade, prices for 
U.S. rare earths imported from China rose exponentially. In less than a decade 
(2002-2011), the average U.S. customs value per metric ton of rare earths 
imported from China rose from $3,111 to $76,239. That is a nominal increase in 
value of 2,432%. Also noteworthy is the particular increase in rare earth value in 
2011 - prices climbed 723% in one year! (See Figure 6.) 
 
Source: USITC Dataweb. 
Note: Rare earth categories as defined by the U.S. Geological Survey. 
Figure 5.  Quantity of U.S. Rare Earth Imports from China and  
the World: 2002–2011 (Metric Tons) 
                                            
39 Morrison and Tang, “China's Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime,” 4–5. 
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Source: USITC Dataweb. 
Note:  Rare earth categories as defined by the U.S. Geological Survey. The data represents 
average prices for all rare earth imports. Prices for individual rare earth commodities differ 
significantly. 
Figure 6.  Customs Value Per Metric Ton of U.S. Rare Earth  
Imports From China: 2002–2011 ($) 
I. CONCLUSION 
Over the course of the last 50 years, remarkable changes in rare earth 
production and, consequently, in distribution, have taken place throughout the 
world. In fact, over the past two decades, the world has witnessed a seemingly 
rising China transition from a rather passive rare earth consumer to one marked 
with extreme dominance and ambition in the global market. Today, with China’s 
rapidly growing economy, and its sharp increase in domestic demand for rare 
earths, China currently holds the position as the world’s largest producer, 




Alloy: A compound that consists of two or more metals, or metals with a 
non-metal. 
Atomic number: The number of protons in the nucleus of an atom 
determines the atomic number of the element. The elements of the periodic table 
are in order by their atomic numbers. 
Bastnaesite: A yellowish to reddish-brown mineral that is a source of rare 
earth elements. 
Dysprosium: A widely used rare earth element that helps to make 
electronic components smaller and faster. 
Lanthanides: Also known as rare earth elements. The lanthanide series 
is the group of elements in which the 4f sublevel is being filled. No other element 
in the periodic table has these properties. 
Minerals: The building blocks of rocks. Geologists define a mineral as: A 
naturally occurring, inorganic, solid, crystalline substance, which has a fixed 
structure and a chemical composition that is either fixed or that may vary within 
certain defined limits. 
Monazite: A reddish-brown phosphate mineral that contains rare earth 
elements. 
Neodymium: A rare earth element that is a critical component of strong 
permanent magnets. Cell phones, portable CD players, computers and most 
modern sound systems would not exist in their current form without using 
neodymium magnets. Neodymium-Iron-Boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets are 
essential for miniaturizing a variety of technologies. These magnets maximize the 
power/cost ratio, and are used in a large variety of motors and mechanical 
systems. 
NdFeB Permanent Magnets: Neodymium-iron-boron magnets. 
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Nonferrous metals: Anything (metal, alloy, compound, etc.) that does not 
contain iron. 
Ore:  A mineral/rock that contains metal that is valuable enough to be 
mined. 
Oxide:  An oxide is any compound of oxygen with another element or 
radical. 
SmCo: Samarium cobalt permanent magnet. 
Tailings: The materials left over after the process of separating the 
valuable fraction from the worthless fraction of an ore. 
Terbium: A rare earth element used in energy efficient fluorescent lamps. 
There are various terbium metal alloys that provide metallic films for magneto 
optic data recording. 
Yttrium: A rare earth element. Almost every vehicle on the road contains 
yttrium based materials that improve the fuel efficiency of the engine. Another 
important use of yttrium is in microwave communications devices. Yttrium-Iron-
Garnets (YIG) are used as resonators in frequency meters, magnetic field 
measurement devices, tunable transistors and Gunn oscillators. Yttrium goes into 
laser crystals specific to spectral characteristics for high-performance 
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III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY PREDICTIONS AND 
THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 
A. INTRODUCTION: 
With China’s recent unprecedented economic rise, People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) leaders have begun to think about the future of international 
relations and how China’s international role should change in the foreseeable 
future. How should China’s senior political and economic officials put the state’s 
quickly growing power to use?40 
Are China’s rare earth policies being implemented such that international actors 
including the United States are compelled to behave in a specified manner (as 
would be predicted by. structural realism) or are China’s actions fostering co-
operative power (as predicted by neoliberal institutionalism)? Both theories are 
feasible; however, only one theory truly explains the actions China has initiated 
recently surrounding its rare earth policies with the United States. As such, this 
chapter will examine these two principal international relations theories as basic 
frameworks in order to assess whether China is using its rare earth policies as a 
tool of economic statecraft. 
The chapter opens by showcasing a theoretical table that highlights two 
competing views in China’s rare earth industry. Also embedded within this table 
are basic theory predictions that characterize China’s behavior associated with 
its rare earth element (REE) policies. The remaining sections introduce key 
terms, definitions and concepts attached to two prominent international relations 
theories, economic statecraft, and interdependence.   
B. THEORY PREDICTIONS ON CHINA’S RARE EARTH BEHAVIOR 
The centerpiece of this chapter is illustrated in the theoretical table, below, 
which I have constructed for the purpose of this thesis. The primary purpose of 
                                            
40 Daniel Lynch, “Chinese Thinking on the Future of International Relations: Realism as the 
Ti, Realism as the Young?*,” The China Quarterly (March 2009). 
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this table is to offer predictions of multiple policy actions we would expect China 
to take in the REE industry on the basis of both structural realism and neoliberal 
institutionalism. Beyond the above policy predictions, the table also contains key 
reactions the United States would likely take in response to China’s behavior 
attached to rare earth trade.  
Table 2.   Alternative Viewpoints on China’s Strategic Intent in the REE 
Industry 
Structural Realism /  
Economic Statecraft 
Neoliberal Institutionalism / 
Interdependence 
Intent: China intentionally threatens the United 
States with its near-monopoly on rare earths by 
exercising multiple policy options.  
Intent: China liberalizes its international 
trade policies in an attempt to foster 
continued economic growth and 
development in its rare earth industry.  
China’s Action #1: Imposes export quotas. 
U.S. Reaction #1: United States resource 
dependency forces the state to purchase rare 
earths at higher prices. 
U.S. Reaction #2: United States foreign 
technology firms are forced to move its 
manufacturing to China. 
U.S. Reaction #3: United States is forced to 
develop or re-open its domestic production 
facilities enabling continued consumer product 
deliverables. 
U.S. Reaction #4: United States is forced to buy 
rare earths from international suppliers other than 
China. 
 
China’s Action #1: Chinese government 
implements free trade and fair access to all 
rare earth supplies. China moves forward 
and abides by all international trading 
regulations including the WTOs stipulated 
rules. (With China claiming that its export 
restrictions are aligned with their domestic 
production and consumption restrictions, 
the likelihood for a litigation by WTO is 
minimized and greater international 
cooperation is anticipated) 
U.S. Reaction #1: United States drops 
WTO claim of charging China with unfair 
rare earth trade practices. 
U.S. Reaction #2: United State purchases 
rare earths at market prices. 
China’s Action #2: Imposes export licenses. 
U.S. Reaction: United States is forced to 
purchase rare earths at higher prices due to 
supplemental requirements. 
China’s Action #3: Imposes export Duties. 
U.S. Reaction: United States is forced to 
purchase rare earths at higher prices due to 
supplemental fees 
China’s Action #2: Chinese government 
cooperates with the broader international 
community including the United States by 
offering its assistance in recycling rare 
earths and developing valuable substitutes 
for the metals. 
U.S. Reaction #1: United States 
prodigiously expands its domestic rare 
earth recycling industry and rapidly 
modernizes its capabilities in developing 




C. STRUCTURAL REALISM OR NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM: 
The following section taken largely by Robert Powell’s work in “Absolute 
and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory”, will illustrate the core 
difference between structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism.41  Having an 
understanding of each theory will not only help to better predict China’s behavior 
associated with rare earths it will also assist in building a comparative 
assessment of China’s strategic intent in the rare earth element industry. In order 
to fully grasp the meaning behind both theories, a better understanding of the 
terms absolute and relative gains must occur. Neoliberal institutionalism theory 
emphasizes that states are concerned with their absolute gains and care less 
about the relative gains of other nations. The theory focuses upon the manner of 
cooperation between states which function in an international environment. In the 
                                            
41 Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” The 
American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (December 1991). 
China’s Action #4: Mandates domestic 
stockpiling.  
U.S. Reaction: United States is forced to 
purchase rare earths from international suppliers 
other than China. 
China’s Action #5: Chinese government requires 
technology in exchange for rare earths. (i.e., 
production of value-added goods) 
 
U.S. Reaction:  United States foreign technology 
firms are forced to move its manufacturing to 
China. 
 
China’s Action #6: Mandates rare earth industry-
wide consolidation program. 
U.S. Reaction: United States is forced to 
purchase rare earths via imports at higher prices. 
 
China’s Action #7: Chinese government imposes 
more stringent environmental laws applicable to 
rare earths. 
U.S. Reaction: United States is forced to 
purchase rare earths via imports at higher prices. 
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case of China’s rare earths, neo-liberal theory would suggest that it does not 
matter whether the United States or China benefits more from the exchange of a 
particular commodity. Ultimately, what is of consequence is that China has 
improved its economic position. In the frame of neoliberal institutionalism theory, 
China would only be concerned with making a profit on the commodity; the U.S.’s 
outcome would be irrelevant. Conversely, according to structural realism or 
neorealism, states are concerned with relative not absolute gains. Often times, a 
state’s utility in structural realism is a function of a relative measure like power. In 
structural realism, both states could conceivably experience a gain; however, 
more gains for one state will tend to be seen as a loss for the other state. This 
particular theory would emphasize that China has improved its relative economic 
position to that of the United States and that this is what China cares about. 
Furthermore, the theory would likely predict U.S. opposition to China’s restrictive 
measures on export quotas claiming unfair trade practices that are not in 
compliance with existing World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations. As a 
result of these measures, China’s domestic commercial actors would experience 
relative gains over the United States due to the escalation of rare earths prices 
levied against international consumers. Thus, all else being equal, the more a 
state cares about relative gains, the less likely any form of international 
cooperation will occur.42   
Under neoliberal institutional theory, Beijing’s international trade policies 
associated with rare earths would be geared toward enhancing economic 
cooperation and development. In other words, if Beijing’s policy actions were in 
line with neoliberal institutionalism theory, Beijing would move forward in one of 
two predicted paths. First, Beijing would forego all restrictions on imposing rare 
earth export quotas in an effort to promote open trade on the international free 
market. Through the analytical lens of this theory, Beijing would continue to 
pursue free and fair access to its rare earth supplies through the use of its 
existing policies. Likewise, its government would continue to abide by all 
                                            
42 Ibid., 1303. 
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international trading regulations including the WTOs currently stipulated rules. 
Alternatively, if Beijing did not engage in the above policy action, its government 
would likely respond by seeking continued cooperation with its international 
trading partners (i.e., U.S. rare earth consumers) through assistance in rare earth 
recycling or by providing substitutes for these valuable resources. (See Table 2.)  
Either way, both policy actions administered by Beijing would emphasize trade 
cooperation and collaboration as opposed to policy choices intended to 
economically harm another state in favor of boosting its own national strategy.  
Having defined the two primary theories for this study, the remainder of 
the chapter will identify interdependence and provide a useful definition for the 
term economic statecraft.  
D. WHAT IS INTERDEPENDENCE? 
The primary reason for identifying the term interdependence in this study 
is to provide us with an alternate principal that is inversely related to the 
economic statecraft principal. As denoted in the above table, both 
interdependence and economic statecraft are paralleled with a corresponding 
theory. If one is able to understand these basic principals, then assessing 
China’s strategic intent becomes more transparent. So what is interdependence 
and does this principal correlate with China’s recent policy actions tied to its REE 
sector? 
According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, interdependence is most 
simply defined as “mutual dependence.”43   More specifically, Keohane and Nye 
define interdependence as the following: “situations characterized by reciprocal 
effects among countries or among actors in different countries.”44  In this 
particular study, the above-mentioned effects will result from international 
transactions in the form of goods (i.e., rare earths) between China and the United 
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States. As Keohane and Nye point out in their book Power and Interdependence, 
interdependence only exists if there are reciprocal costly effects between two 
countries making an international transaction.45 In the context of this thesis, both 
China and the United States would share some degree of cost if an international 
transaction were to take place. For instance, if China were to export rare earths 
to the United States, its cost would be the loss of valuable resources while the 
United States would invariably incur the cost of paying for these commodities. 
Alternatively, interdependence is not characterized as being an equally balanced 
mutual dependence between two states. Instead, Keohane and Nye assess that 
asymmetries in interdependence develop which provide sources of influence for 
states. In other words, less dependent states are often able to use the 
interdependent relationship as a source of power (i.e., control over resources).46 
In this study, even if one presumes that China is the less dependent state of the 
two as Washington relies heavily upon Beijing for the availability of rare earth 
resources, the question remains as to whether China’s rare earth policies are 
used as tools of statecraft or interdependence.  
In order to truly understand the term interdependence and the role it has 
within international relations, it is also important to define the word vulnerability. 
According to Keohane and Nye, vulnerability can be defined as “an actor’s 
liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been 
altered.”47 In this thesis, the United States’ vulnerability to actions by China’s rare 
earth exporters would be largely determined by the effectiveness of its altered 
policies. For example, if the United States’ new policies (i.e., purchasing rare 
earths from domestic suppliers or foreign suppliers outside of China) could bring 
sufficient quantities of rare earths at lower costs, than United States vulnerability 
would be mitigated. In other words, just because the United States imports nearly 
all of its rare earths from China does not indicate U.S. vulnerability; only by 
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knowing what it would cost in terms of time and money to obtain such substitutes 
can vulnerability interdependence be established.48 I would argue that 
vulnerability is important because this dynamic is essential for understanding the 
political framework of interdependent relations.  As Keohane and Nye note, “it 
focuses on which actors are the definers of the ceteris paribus clause, or can set 
the rules of the game.”49  Although it is difficult to prove, it appears vulnerability 
asymmetries are in favor of China. When a comparison is done between the two 
countries, China’s alternatives to imposing export quotas on rare earths (such as 
supplying rare earths to domestic manufacturers) are more attractive than the 
United State’s alternatives to importing rare earths from China (rare earth 
production and consumption from domestic mines and rare earth imports from 
foreign sources excluding China).50  
The last element crucial to the fundamentals of interdependence is what 
Keohane and Nye call complex interdependence. In essence, complex 
interdependence is the opposite of economic statecraft. Take a government’s 
domestic activities for instance. As a state’s domestic economic policies grow 
and become more complex, they begin to overlap and impinge on the state’s 
foreign economic policies. In the context of this particular study, it would be akin 
to China altering its foreign economic policies (i.e., imposing export quotas on 
rare earths) as a result of its own domestic policy trade regulations. By forcing its 
own mining companies to obtain new licenses and limit its own internal rare earth 
production capabilities, it would only be logical for Beijing to then change its 
international economic policies.51   
In the context of this study, interdependence would suggest that Beijing 
would employ rare earth policies to further its economic prosperity through 
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enhanced international cooperation.  Conversely, employing an economic 
statecraft approach would suggest diminishing international cooperation via 
deliberate economic manipulation. In other words, employing specific REE 
policies that deliberately strengthen China’s economic prosperity and strategic 
interests while forcing the United States to suffer economically. In 
interdependence, China’s strategic intentions could be attained but only if it were 
cooperating with an international actor such as the United States. If China used 
its rare earth policies as a tool of economic statecraft, it could attain its strategic 
interests, but it would be at the expense of any international cooperation.  
(See Table 2.)  
E. WHAT IS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT?  
Prior to defining the term economic statecraft, it is important to realize that 
this principle is closely related to structural realism. Although structural realism is 
a theory, both terms are centered on attaining economic gains at the expense of 
another state. Furthermore, both terms are geared toward seeking strategic 
interests through economic manipulation. Economic statecraft denotes the use of 
policy to fulfill the main goals of nation-states in the international scheme. 
According to David Baldwin, “statecraft is most usefully thought of in broad and 
multidimensional terms.”52 By definition, “it involves the application and interplay 
of multiple instruments - military, economic, diplomatic, and informational - to 
achieve the multiple objectives of states, including national security, economic 
prosperity, and political prestige and influence.”53 Although this definition is not 
incorrect and in the practice of international relations, states do seem to utilize 
the interplay of multiple instruments, this perspective is entirely too broad. Thus, 
for purposes of this thesis and my contribution to answering the question as to 
what extent China uses rare earth policies as a tool of economic statecraft, I will 
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narrow Baldwin’s definition to include only economic interaction among states to 
achieve economic prosperity. As such, I follow William Norris in defining 
economic statecraft as the deliberate use of economic manipulation pursued by a 
state (i.e., foreign policy makers) to influence the economic behavior of both its 
domestic and international actors.54 
Defining economic statecraft in these terms enables us to be more 
accurate about the conditions by which states attempt to use economic 
interaction to promote their national objectives.55  Baldwin seems to add some 
utility in the definition of economic statecraft in the following statement: “influence 
attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of 
market price in terms of money.”56 It is in these words, where he effectively 
illustrates the economic significance in which states interact with other 
international actors in an effort to attain their own economic strategic goals. For 
example, by China deliberately manipulating the market price of rare earths by 
imposing export quotas on U.S. firms operating in China, its government is able 
to strengthen its own economic interests. Thus, when characterizing economic 
statecraft, it is important to address both the state’s impact on the international 
system and its influence with its own domestic enterprises.57 Together, these two 
elements help accurately define a useful definition of economic statecraft. Having 
defined economic statecraft, interdependence, and specified the two broad 
international relations theories, the next task is to more explicitly consider how 
countries conduct economic statecraft.  
                                            
54 Norris, “Economic Statecraft with Chinese Charachteristics,” 19. 
55 Ibid., 23. 
56 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
57 Norris, “Economic Statecraft with Chinese Charachteristics,” 23. 
 38
F. HOW DO WE KNOW IF COUNTRIES ARE PARTICIPATING IN 
ECONOMIC STATECRAFT? 
In order to determine whether countries are participating in economic 
statecraft, it is critical to examine the various types of leverage one state can 
apply to another. Klaus Knorr defines leverage as “one actor using a lever to gain 
advantage over another actor.”58 He goes on to say that countries can use their 
economic capabilities as a tool of economic statecraft through four basic 
methods: coercion; weakening other economies; attaining monopolist market 
power; and achievement of general influence.59 Knorr identifies the following four 
elements of economic power. 
The first method of economic power, and arguably the most important 
within this study, is coercion. An example of coercive economic statecraft would 
involve China intentionally withholding or threatening to withhold the supply of 
rare earths in an effort to compel an international actor (i.e., United States) to 
behave in a specified manner. By using structural realism theory as a basic 
framework, seven possible policy actions by China become apparent. Structural 
realism predicts these outcomes as all seven policy actions share a common 
trait. That is each action employed by China denotes an act of economic 
manipulation in order to influence the economic behavior of either its domestic 
enterprises or an international actor. Furthermore, the structural realism theory 
presupposes that relative economic gains would be attained by China while the 
United States would be forced to react at a cost. (See Table 2.) 
The first reaction in table two predicts that the United States will respond 
by purchasing rare earths at higher prices. By China’s action to impose rare earth 
export quotas, fewer commodities would be available to trade on the market 
resulting in higher demand and increased prices. Should the United States be 
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compelled to take this option, China would be in a better relative position as its 
domestic consumers would experience considerably lower prices.  
A second predicted reaction by the United States as a result of resource 
supply limitations would encompass moving its hi-tech manufacturing firms 
oversees to China or order to obtain access to low-cost rare earths. Similar to the 
above reaction, this response would also give Beijing a relative economic 
advantage as valuable U.S. technologies would be transferred to China in 
exchange for rare earths.   
A third predicted reaction would involve relying on domestic production 
mining centers. By forgoing the purchase of expensive rare earths, the United 
States would be forced to invest in massive domestic infrastructure as its rare 
earth production facilities are currently in their infancy stages. This policy option 
would clearly favor Beijing as its action would force the United States to spend an 
immense amount of funding to cover the internal costs of rare earth exploitation.  
Finally, by utilizing structural realism theory as a framework to predict 
China’s behavior and likely U.S. responses, there is the possibility for the United 
States to purchase rare earths from international suppliers other than China. 
Although this option is the least abrasive form of economic statecraft, it does still 
give China a competitive advantage as the cost to buy rare earths will invariably 
be higher for the United States.  
The second method of economic power is weakening other economies. 
This method entails directly impacting another state’s economic security and/or 
capabilities without any effort to make it behave in a certain way. In the case with 
China’s rare earth policies, the state could conceivably withhold the supply of 
rare earths in an effort to ensure the United States does not have the necessary 
rare earth components to manufacture specialized military weapon systems. In 
this instance, China’s withholding of rare earths would be implemented in order 
to weaken the United States’ military capabilities.60 
                                            
60 Ibid., 100. 
 40
The third form of economic power applicable to this study is the use of 
attaining a monopolist market power in the international economy. Within the 
context of this study, China would exercise the use of its monopoly power by 
restricting export quotas on rare earths in order to achieve high economic profits. 
 Lastly, the final form of economic power a state can wield is its 
achievement of general influence. In other words, a state possesses the 
capability to influence another state through its own economic policies. China in 
this instance could influence the economic behavior of the United States simply 
by withholding its supply of REEs.61 
G. STATE MANIPULATION OF COMMERCIAL ACTORS 
As defined by William Norris’ work, Economic Statecraft with Chinese 
Characteristics: The Use of Commercial Actors in China’s Grand Strategy, 
economic statecraft takes place when states not only influence the behavior of 
international actors via economic means but also through the influence of its 
domestic commercial actors.62 Despite the inherent phenomenon of commercial 
actors acting on their own interests, states often create various incentives for 
commercial actors so that in the end a state’s overarching national strategic 
objectives can be achieved. By acting in such a manner, states can pursue 
strategies by managing the incentives of its commercial actors.63 In the context 
of this study, this approach would be akin to China giving rare earth price breaks 
to its domestic industries by waiving licensing fees or duties while imposing these 
expenses on an international firm.   
As for the relation between this phenomenon and economic statecraft, I would 
submit that economic statecraft could not exist without a state’s ability to 
influence its domestic actors. Conversely, interdependence matters less when 
explaining this phenomenon. To be sure, states do rely on their domestic rare 
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earth enterprises for revenue; however, it is the effectiveness of a state’s 
influence or economic control on its domestic partners that truly allow a state to 
attain its strategic objectives. 
Thus, in order to truly understand economic statecraft, one must examine 
how a state manipulates the economic activities of its domestic commercial 
actors. How do states control domestic actors who are responsible for producing 
these strategic goals?  I follow Norris in observing that if China were to conduct 
economic statecraft, the state must be able to provide incentives to its 
commercial actors in a manner that is compatible with the governments’ own 
national interests.  Thus, a government’s capability to manipulate and control its 
domestic actors becomes directly relevant when depicting economic statecraft.64  
This next section advances the work done by William Norris in his 
dissertation entitled, Economic Statecraft with Chinese Characteristics:  The Use 
of Commercial Actors in China’s Grand Strategy. Specifically, Norris highlights a 
framework that depicts five fundamental factors that are necessary in 
determining whether or not a state is capable of controlling its domestic 
economic actors. His work is important to this thesis as it lays out the 
fundamental principles necessary for economic statecraft to occur. On the basis 
of his work, I will apply a structured assessment using predicted rare earth policy 
actions to determine the extent to which China is using its policies as a tool of 
economic statecraft. Similarly, I will expand his work in order to assess China’s 
future strategic intentions and power status as a rising economic nation. 
First, and arguably the most important, is the compatibility of goals 
between the state and the commercial entity. If the basic goals of the state are 
closely in line with the goals of the commercial actor, then one would presume 
that more cooperation would occur. In this instance, the objectives of the 
commercial actors are compatible with the state’s goals. (i.e., financial profits, 
productivity improvements, market development, etc.) Thus, the state is more 
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easily able to attain its national strategic interests since its goals are 
complementary to the commercial actors’ objectives.  In the end, when a state’s 
goals are compatible with those of the commercial actors, the state will find it 
simpler to control or manage commercial actors in its quest of strategic 
objectives.65 
Second is overall market organization or structural arrangement within the 
economic system. When markets are highly fragmented, state control becomes 
difficult to manage. Moreover, as the number of commercial actors increase, a 
state’s ability to monitor and enforce compliance becomes incrementally more 
difficult. Conversely, the higher the market’s concentration comprising fewer 
companies, the easier it is for a state to control their behavior. Thus, if there are 
too many commercial actors, the state will likely have difficulty managing them, 
while too few will create dominant commercial actors impeding government 
initiatives to control their actions.66 
Third, is the extent by which the state represents one unified position. For 
if the government is divided, state control over its commercial actors diminishes. 
Any situation where there are competing political authorities or the state 
encounters opposing factions, it will be more challenging to manage commercial 
actors. For example, anytime the central government must contend with 
provincial and local authorities, states will find it hard to use commercial actors to 
pursue its strategic interests. Furthermore, when the state is separated by 
competing political factions, commercial actors can exploit one set of interests off 
each group that in turn weakens the state’s ability to control the commercial 
actors.67  
The fourth factor is the relationship between the state and the commercial 
actor. More precisely, the relationship between both entities ultimately depends 
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on the following three characteristics: 1.) disposition of ownership arrangement, 
2.)  management structure, and 3.) financing structure. The fewer obstacles and 
more direct the relationship between the state and the commercial actors, the 
easier it will be for the state to control the commercial actor. For instance, when 
the state directly owns an enterprise, one would anticipate more efficient control. 
Likewise, companies whose managers are directly hired by the state are more 
easily managed than an enterprise whose managers are elected by private 
shareholders. With the anticipation of China’s probable rare earth industry 
consolidation and the shift toward state ownership, China’s government will likely 
encounter less resistance and experience easier control of its commercial actors. 
Lastly, companies who primarily rely on state authorities for their financing are 
more likely to meet the governments’ interests than one bound to private 
shareholders.68 
Lastly, the fifth factor is the relative distribution of resources between the 
state and the commercial actors. When states possess large budgets, 
experienced monetary authorities, and are capable of effectively executing 
commercial activities, one would presume a high degree of commercial actor(s) 
control. Challenges in exercising economic statecraft are generally overcome 
when states are able to build an advanced infrastructure capable of monitoring 
and regulating the commercial actors. Conversely, if the commercial actor such 
as a Chinese domestic rare earth firm possesses relatively greater finances, one 
would expect greater autonomy from the firm and less control by the poorly 
resourced state. Thus, a state’s ability to exercise close control over the 
commercial actor is largely dependent upon the difference present in the overall 
level of resources available.69   
As suggested earlier, all of the above factors Norris identifies are crucial 
aspects to economic statecraft as each component helps to assess the success 
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or failure of a state to influence the behavior of its domestic actors. Without 
having any indicators to measure a states’ success in controlling its domestic 
industries, a valid assessment on China’s use of rare earth element policies 
could not be determined. However, by having a clear understanding of Norris’ 
previously described factors and how they relate to statecraft, my contribution in 
identifying Chinese behavior in rare earths becomes possible. Having delineated 
how a state implements control over commercial actors, the next objective is to 
consider how this control relates to successful economic statecraft. 
H. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 
In this final section, Norris’ framework on the effectiveness of statecraft 
augments my study by expanding on the fundamentals of economic statecraft. 
His work captured below not only identifies the conditions by which statecraft is 
successful, but more importantly helps us to further understand the relationship 
between a state and both its domestic and foreign actors. By better 
understanding the circumstances in which statecraft is successful, I can more 
easily predict the policy actions China would employ in order to attain its strategic 
interests.  
Although economic power is often a challenging mechanism of 
international power to exercise, when it does take place it can be extremely 
effective. What are the defining factors that account for a countries successful 
use of economic statecraft?  Why at times do some states realize their national 
goals by utilizing economic statecraft and others fall short?  In other words, why 
does economic statecraft succeed?70  
Although state control of domestic commercial actors (i.e., rare earth 
consumers, producers, suppliers) is imperative for economic statecraft to unfold, 
constraint alone is not sufficient enough to assure the success of a countries’ 
strategic goals. Beyond a states’ control of its commercial actors, states must 
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also fulfill three additional conditions. The first condition that determines whether 
or not economic statecraft is likely to succeed depends on how the outcome 
matches up with the target state’s own objectives. In other words, the strategic 
ends desired can not be greater than the economic means available to realize 
those ends.71  Thus, economic statecraft with a more conservative national 
objective directed against a less confrontational state will be more successful 
than a government who possesses unrealistic goals directed against a state 
whose position is not favorable with the intended objective. Put differently, 
economic statecraft is successful only when the ends are in line with the means. 
Conversely, when the goals are not in proportion to the economic tools levied 
against the target state, economic statecraft will likely be unsuccessful.72 For 
instance, if China were to promote a strategy of rare earth resources in exchange 
for technology (conservative national objective; strategic ends) by imposing 
export quotas (economic means) against a non-aggressive state, the probability 
of success for economic statecraft would be high.  
The second condition is the relative scale of the economic interaction. For 
example, a country whose trade consists of the majority of its GDP will be 
significantly more affected by disruptions than those whose trade equates to a 
small percentage of their overall economy. All else equal, the relative scale of a 
state’s economic interaction must be fairly substantial in order for economic 
statecraft to be an effective tool.73   
The third factor that measures a state’s overall effectiveness in economic 
statecraft is its elasticity of demand among economic interaction between two 
countries. In the context of this condition, higher inelasticity equates to more 
effective economic statecraft.74  An example of this factor would involve U.S. 
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actors being dependent on Chinese rare earths, as substitutes for these 
resources are often difficult to obtain. Therefore, effective economic statecraft 
has a greater likelihood of success if the state seeks moderate goals and 
possesses fairly large inelastic economic interaction. 
The fourth and final factor for determining a state’s overall effectiveness in 
economic statecraft is its ability to control economic interaction. To be sure, 
states wield their economic policies on international actors in order to attain 
national objectives; however, the degree to which a state is able to control its 
domestic economic interaction matters as well. The magnitude by which a state 
is able to control its economic interaction is largely a function of its domestic 
economic structure. In other words, states, especially China, choose to organize 
their domestic economies via a series of government-business relationships. 
Moreover, it is the nature of these domestic relationships that often governs the 
extent by which the state has control over its economic interaction with 
international states. Thus, states who possess more control over their domestic 
economy will be better able to direct their economic interaction and far more 
likely to attain success in their efforts to engage in economic statecraft.75  For 
purposes of this study, Beijing is likely to be effective in its attempts to engage in 
economic statecraft as many if not all of its rare earth businesses in China are or 
will become state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, despite the above 
claimed assessment, states with centrally planned economies are also less 
efficient in economic productivity. As time passes, this lower economic 
productivity restrains the size of a countries’ overall economy. In the end, the 
smaller a state’s economy, the less economic power a state has to wield. Thus, 
following Norris, I would argue that although a state requires the ability to direct 
its economic power for economic statecraft to be effective, too much state 
intervention tends to lead to inefficiency and a less capable economy over time. 
Likewise, when the state has a very limited role within the country, the economy 
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could grow immensely but the state would find it exceedingly difficult to control 
economic power.76   
I. CONCLUSION: 
This chapter put forward three important perceptions that offer analytic 
leverage for considering economic statecraft. First, economic statecraft is 
properly understood through the context of defining two prominent international 
relations theories—structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism. By 
qualitatively measuring the extent to which the predictions of these theories are 
borne out and using each as a basic framework to predict China’s rare earth 
policy actions, we can further assess the extent to which China is using its rare 
earth policies as a tool of economic statecraft.  
Second, in order to predict China’s future rare earth policies, we must 
have a clear understanding of the mechanisms required for China to control its 
economic power. By having a fundamental understanding of these relationships, 
we can better place Chinas’ REE policies with an appropriate theory. 
Third, beyond the close examination of a state’s international economic 
interaction and its control over its domestic commercial actors, we were able to 
identify the conditions by which effective statecraft occurs. After analyzing the 
conditions of successful statecraft, better predictions of China’s rare earth policy 
actions can occur and more accurate assessments can be established as to 
China’s long-term strategic intentions. 
In short, by stipulating the two theories basic frameworks and accurately 
defining economic statecraft including its conditions for success, an appropriate 
assessment of the strategic goals of China’s rare earth policies can be 
developed. The empirical chapter that follows not only defines China’s rare earth 
policies, but it also provides three illustrative stories that attempt to substantiate 
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how China’s policies are being utilized as a tool of economic statecraft as 
opposed to a measure of interdependence.  
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IV. RARE EARTH POLICIES: STRUCTURED ASSESSMENT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Within the last few years, China’s management of its rare earth policies 
has attracted the attention of many international actors within the global 
economic environment. In particular, China’s place as the world’s top producer 
and supplier of rare earths and its recent policies including imposing export 
quotas have raised considerable concern for Washington. The U.S. government 
has often challenged China’s policy measures stating that its actions could 
weaken the competitiveness of U.S. firms as well as raise rare earth prices. Still 
others are cognizant of the possibility that China’s near-monopoly over its rare 
earths could be used as leverage against the United States.77 
Despite the United States being the dominant leader in rare earth 
production in the late 1980s, favorable policies implemented by the Chinese 
government and weak environmental standards enabled China to become the 
new leader in rare earth supply. Today, numerous analysts submit that China’s 
recent policy initiatives to reduce exports and consolidate the industry are 
intended to promote domestically produced hi-tech value added products. 
Moreover, others argue that China’s reason for implementing strict rare earth 
export policies are to compel foreign companies (i.e., United States) to move its 
facilities to China with the ultimate intent of transferring its technology to Chinese 
businesses. China conversely denies that its rare earth policies are used for 
political purposes or as a tool of economic statecraft. Rather, China submit that it 
is exercising these new policies simply to address environmental concerns in 
China and to better manage and conserve non-renewable natural resources.78  
The purpose of this chapter is to effectively articulate through qualitative 
measures the strategic intention behind China’s rare earth policies. To that end, 
                                            
77 Morrison and Tang, “China's Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime,” 1–2. 
78 Ibid., 1–2. 
 50
the three illustrative stories enclosed will attempt to highlight various views and 
perspectives to help answer the question as to whether or not China’s rare earth 
policies are being utilized as a tool of economic statecraft.  
B. CHINA’S RARE EARTH INDUSTRY POLICIES: STATECRAFT LEVER? 
This table lays out seven major rare earth policy initiatives that China has 
attempted to implement in recent history, as identified by Morrison and Tang, and 
each discussed in more detail in the section below.79  The table’s purpose is to 
qualitatively measure China’s strategic intentions by linking its key policy actions 
with the designated organization responsible for regulating the policy, the stated 
long-term goal, and the magnitude of the statecraft lever. Although all seven 
policies disclosed below are critical components in identifying China’s strategic 
intentions, it is worth noting that each policy has varying degrees of statecraft 
leverage. For example, since the policy of imposing export quotas had the most 
influence on the economic behavior of its domestic and international actors, it 
received the highest magnitude of statecraft leverage.  Conversely, stockpiling 
received a score of (2) as this policy action had minimal influence on the 
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Table 3.   China’s Rare Earth Industry Policies 
 
Date Policy Name  Organization/ 
Committee 
Stated Goal Statecraft Lever? 
Lever Magnitude: 
1-2 = Low  
 3    = Moderate 
4-5 = High        
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and utilization with 
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Yes; High statecraft; 
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2007-2012 (4) Export Duties Ministry of 
Commerce 
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leaving China 
Yes; High statecraft; 
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2009-2012 (6) Industry 
Consolidation: (i.e., 
Plans for Developing 
the Rare Earth 
Industry 2009-2015) 
Ministry of Land 
and Resources 
(MLR) 
Establish three rare 
earth production 
districts and two 
production 
systems; create a 
unified front for the 









earths pricing and 
help ensure future 
supplies 





C. CHINA’S RARE EARTHS’ POLICIES: STATECRAFT INTERVENTIONS 
The Chinese government has implemented several policies to manage 
rare earth production as well as control exports. While some policy measures 
seem to be aimed at more internal control, others appear to influence the 
behaviors of its international customers such as the United States. Many of 
China’s policies such as export quotas, duties, and license requirements have 
caused significant concerns throughout the world as these restrictions not only 
skew global trade of raw materials but also gives Chinese companies cheaper 
access to rare earths.  
In 2006, China started to decrease its rare earth exports, claiming increased 
domestic demand and environmental degradation concerns. As a result of these 
actions, critical supply uncertainties were created among key industries 
worldwide and significant price increases were noted beginning in 2009.80 
As of 2008 and 2009, the Chinese government started to initiate 
regulations to ensure greater control over the rare earth industry. For instance in 
2008, China’s Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) issued the Guidelines for 
Development of National Mineral Resources 2008-2015. This new directive was 
expressly created with the intention to protect and rationally utilize China’s 
valuable natural resources for the period between 2008-2015. This development 
plan not only designated rare earths as protected minerals but its exploitation 
and production was also to be strictly controlled by the government.81 
As noted by Morrison and Tang in their most recent Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) report, China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime: 
Economic and Trade Implications for the United States, the Chinese government 
has attempted to implement the following seven key rare earth policy measures: 
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(1) export quotas; (2) environmental laws (3) export licenses; (4) export duties; 
(5) technology for resources; (6) industry consolidation; and (7) stockpiling.82 
(See Table 3.) 
1. Export Quotas 
Of greatest concern to the international community, particularly the United 
States, the Chinese central government has been imposing export quotas in 
order to have enough resources for its own industries and to regain control of its 
domestic production. It is important to note that all annual quotas mandated by 
China are allocated to domestic companies and joint ventures with foreign 
investors. Between 2005-2010, total quotas have decreased nearly every year as 
China’s internal demand for rare earths has significantly increased. Moreover, 
joint ventures with foreign investors have seen their allotted quotas cut more 
severely than their counterparts, particularly after 2009.83 (See Table 4.) 
Table 4.   China’s Export Quotas on Rare Earths 
 
Sources: China Rare Earth website (http://www.cre.net/show.php?contentid=97130, as 
viewed on February 28, 2012): 2009-2011 Rare Earth Export Quotas; Pui-Kwan Tse, China’s 
Rare Earth Industry, U.S. Geological Survey, Open File Report 2011-1042, Table 1. 
Notes: China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that the first-round quota figures of 24,904 
tons represents 80% of the 2012 full year quota is calculated based on the MOC 
announcement. 
 
Although the official rare earths export quota figures for 2011 were 
comparable to that of the 2010 level, in 2011, only half of the export quotas were 
filled due to poor global demand and decreasing rare earth prices at the end of 
                                            
82 Ibid., 12–20. 
83 Ibid., 17. 
 54
2011. Another likely factor for the diminished rare earth export figures is that 
many rare earth manufacturers wanted to minimize resource usage and/or push 
for alternative products in order to lower costs and decrease their dependence on 
Chinese materials. An example of this taking place occurred in August 2011 
when General Electric (GE) announced the development of wind turbine 
generators that were intended to reduce dependence on rare earths. As for 2012, 
rare earth export quotas appear to be unchanged, leaving them higher than 
expected. Nevertheless, with only half of the quotas filled in 2011, it does not 
necessarily imply that Beijing is loosening its control over rare earths. If anything, 
this is evidence that China’s government has become more stringent in its efforts 
to conserve resources and ultimately protect the environment.84 
The above evidence suggests it is the Chinese central government that is 
exercising statecraft intervention; however, as for who is benefiting and who is 
losing the evidence appears to be somewhat more convoluted. Initially between 
2005-2010, a rather clear pattern of winners and losers was established. Even 
though total quotas had decreased, the joint ventures with foreign investors (i.e., 
U.S. businesses) suffered more cuts than the domestic Chinese firms. Thus, 
during this period, Beijing’s choice in policy affected its international customers 
more so than any of its domestic corporations. Unfortunately, the winners and 
losers beyond 2010 are considerably more difficult to determine. For instance, 
the U.S. position claims an upward trend in Chinese rare earth production quotas 
while its export quotas are moving downward. If this were the case, domestic 
enterprises would be the benefactor while foreign partners such as the United 
States would be the losers. China, however, disagrees and asserts that it has 
also implemented similar restrictive policies on its own domestic companies. 
Nevertheless, based on the previously stated fact that only half of the 2011 
quotas were filled, it is my assessment that the Chinese central government is 
favoring statecraft intervention. 
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2. Environmental Laws 
Within the past few years, out of the necessity of environmental protection, 
China has been steadily improving its control over highly polluting and resource-
based products. As related to the rare earth industry in particular, the Chinese 
government has attempted to implement several policies to better manage rare 
earth development and utilization with environmental protection. Since the 1980s, 
China has enacted several laws related to environmental protection, including 
among others the Environmental Protection Law, Law on the Prevention and 
Control of Water Pollution, and control of the total pollutant discharge. Other laws 
the state promulgated concerned the Regulations on Land Reclamation which 
demanded such issues as mining, environmental protection and land reclamation 
be conducted concurrently in an effort to restore the currently damaged 
environment. With the implementation of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), 
Beijing has also promoted energy conservation and emission reduction as part of 
its overall strategy it achieve national economic and social development. In 2011, 
as an effort to boost environmental protection efforts in the rare earth industry, 
Beijing enforced the Pollutant Discharge Standards for the Rare Earth Industry. 
This measure was specifically intended to set limits on chemical oxygen demand 
(COD), as well as the emission of various pollutants such as ammonia nitrogen, 
phosphorus, thorium and chlorine gas.85 
Today, China has undergone initiatives to establish an environmental risk 
assessment system specifically for its rare earth industry. The discussion draws 
on a government white paper detailing this system. Recently, their government 
has enforced this assessment system with little to no leniency.86 In fact, 
according to current environmental laws, an analysis, prediction and assessment 
report of the environmental impact that may be caused by rare earth production 
must be submitted in advance otherwise the project will be denied. Another 
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measure the state enforces to ensure environmental protection is attained 
involves observing the following stipulation in the Environmental Protection Law:  
All installations for the control and prevention of pollution at a particular 
production facility must be designed and built with the main part of the facility, 
and this facility should not be utilized until such installations are examined and 
deemed in compliance with environmental authorities in charge. China is also 
known to exercise a pollution discharge license system as well as implement the 
newly enforced Pollutant Discharge Standards for the Rare Earth Industry. By 
Chinese law, rare earth corporations are forbidden to discharge pollutants before 
they obtain pollution discharge licenses.87 
Although not directly a policy measure, the state also delivers special 
environmental protection campaigns that regulate the industries of the rare earth 
sector. Within these campaigns, government authorities require rare earth 
companies to not only expedite the construction of environmental protection 
installations, but also comply with the pollutant discharge standards. 
Corporations who fail to meet these requirements are required to stop production 
and are instructed to close their operations should the appropriate corrective 
measures not be taken. According to the Chinese government, rare earth 
enterprises that contribute to heavy pollution, cause environmental hazards or 
violate the laws and regulations applicable to environmental protection will have 
their cases publicized, and potentially face disciplinary actions.88 
Whether the rare earth companies operating in China are foreign joint 
ventures, Chinese privately owned companies, or Chinese SOEs, all three will 
likely be required to comply with the above disclosed policy regulations. As for 
whether or not we are likely to see the state engage in policies that are used for 
statecraft intervention, this would ultimately be dependent upon whether or not 
rare earth businesses comply with the state’s environmental regulations.  As 
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most of these regulations ultimately require additional funding for the rare earth 
firms, it is quite possible that compliance will be ignored. Thus, if we see a trend 
whereby rare earth companies operating in China are not meeting government 
environmental standards (i.e., obtain pollution discharge licenses, build 
environmental protection facilities, etc.), Beijing could very well engage in policies 
that exhibit economic statecraft.89 
3. Export Licenses 
As specified under Chinese regulation, foreign companies are strictly 
prohibited from mining rare earths in China. Likewise, foreign investors are also 
restricted from participating in rare earth smelting and separation processes, 
unless these firms form joint ventures with Chinese partners. Similar to their 
Chinese counterparts, joint ventures are however authorized to export their 
products under a licensing system managed by the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOC). Over the last few years, Beijing has slowly reduced the number of 
licensed firms through tightening licensing rules and environmental regulations. 
As early as 2006, China began limiting the number of export licenses within the 
country with 47 domestic and 12 joint venture rare earth licenses. In 2009, China 
permitted 23 domestic and 11 joint venture licenses. In 2010, the numbers were 
further reduced to 22 domestic and 10 joint venture participants, while finally in 
2011 the numbers dropped to 22 domestic and 9 joint venture firms. As of 2012, 
the Chinese government has only allocated initial export quotas to 9 companies 
with 17 additional companies awaiting inspection results. Even if all 17 
companies pass newly promulgated environmental regulations, the total licenses 
for 2012 will still come under 2011 figures.90 
As noted by the analysis above, it is the Chinese central government itself 
that is coordinating these statecraft interventions with the international firms 
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operating in China most negatively impacted. When one examines the numbers 
above, it is clear that although both domestic and joint venture licenses are being 
cut by the Chinese government, more licenses are granted to Chinese domestic 
companies. Thus, it is the international firms, notably U.S. businesses, who lose 
in the end. Although the MOC is ultimately responsible for managing these firms, 
it is the central government that sets policy and arguably is the entity that 
enforces the degree of economic statecraft.  
4. Export Duties 
China began to exercise export duties in 2007 in order to control the type 
and quantity of rare earths being shipped outside of China. In 2007, the duty 
rates were set at 10% and applied to less products than today. Over the years, 
duty rates have increased and now range anywhere between 15%-25%. An 
example of these elevated rates can be seen in China’s 2011 export duty 
schedule where ferroalloys containing more than 10% of rare earth elements 
(REEs) were exposed to a 25% export duty.91 
In the case of export duties, the Chinese central government is the 
primary entity for implementing this particular policy while the MOC is the 
organization delegated to manage and control the variety and quantity of rare 
earth products leaving China. As for identifying the specific participants who 
benefit and consequently lose under this prescribed policy, it is the foreign 
customers (i.e., United States) importing these rare earths that lose out as prices 
are inherently higher while the Chinese domestic entities yet again gain a 
noticeable competitive advantage over its international rivals. 
5. Technology For Resources 
Chinese industry officials are presently working on developing a new 
policy that is intended to lure foreign companies to establish rare earth 
processing facilities in China, ultimately creating more profitable downstream 
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processing capabilities. The plan would involve imposing more export quotas 
thereby forcing foreign firms to move their high-tech facilities to China. In 2002, 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued a directive 
detailing regulations governing foreign investments in China’s rare earth sector. 
Specific rules included the following: 
Foreign companies are prohibited from any rare earth mining 
business. Foreign companies are not permitted to participate in rare 
earth smelting and separation projects by themselves. Exceptions 
will be made when they form joint ventures with Chinese partners. 
Foreign companies are encouraged to invest in downstream rare 
earth  products.92 
This new policy initiative, if implemented, will fit remarkably well with China’s goal 
of expanding it rare earth business to the more elaborate and highly technical 
processing sectors.93   
According to this information, it is the Chinese central government that has  
overall oversight of the technology for resources initiative, while the managers or 
those implementing the directives embody the NDRC. Benefactors under this 
policy are primarily the Chinese domestic state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as 
these entities will profit financially from value-added hi-tech applications 
produced in China; however, in the long-term I would argue that the state will 
also benefit as national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rises. 
6. Industry Consolidation 
Over the past few years, Beijing has made it a priority to close small rare 
earth operations and consolidate larger ones in order to gain more control. 
China’s policy goal as stated in “Plans for Developing the Rare Earth Industry 
2009-2015” called for the establishment of three large rare earth production 
districts and two production systems. If implemented, this policy would separate 
the rare earth industry into the following three districts: North (Inner Mongolia and 
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Shandong), South (Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, and Jiangxi) and West 
(Sichuan). (See Figure 7.) Likewise, the plan would establish two major rare 
earth systems within China: one in the north and one in the south. Light rare 
earths would predominantly be mined in northern China while medium-to-heavy 
rare earths in southern China.94 
 
 
Source: Plans for Developing the Rare Earth Industry 2009-2015.  
Note: Map prepared by Congressional Research Service (CRS). 
Figure 7.  Planned Rare Earth Production Districts in China 
As of May 2011, Baotou Steel Rare Earth High-Tech Co. (Baotou Rare 
Earth) has been designated as the single government controlled monopoly to 
mine and process rare earths in northern China. During this same timeframe, the 
Inner Mongolia government also selected 31 mostly private rare earth companies 
to close along with four companies named to merge with Baotou Rare Earth. As 
for southern China, the government plans on consolidating the industry by 
allowing three companies to control 80% of the production within the next several 
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years. All three of these companies are reportedly former government ministries 
with the central government still maintaining the majority of equity in the 
businesses. Should these four state-owned companies succeed in controlling 
China’s rare earth industry, they may end up imposing undesirable limitations on 
countries like the United States.  With China’s emphasis placed on consolidating 
the industry by greatly reducing the overall number of rare earth mines and 
phasing out outdated and inefficient mining practices, the United States may very 
well be compelled to seek other options.95 
With the proposed consolidation efforts in progress and all subsequent 
management and ownership converting to SOEs, it is my assessment that both 
the U.S. firms operating in China as well as the Chinese privately owned 
companies will be hit the hardest. Under this new policy plan, it is almost certain 
that the Chinese central government will be the benefactors in this arrangement. 
7. Stockpiling 
According to Xu Guangxian, China’s “Father of Rare Earths,” “We (China) 
must set up a stockpiling system for rare earths and thorium (thorium for energy) 
and support leading domestic producers like Baogang, Minmetals, and Jiangxi 
Copper to implement the stockpiling.”96  Similarly, An Sihu, assistant director of 
the Rare Earth High-Tech Zone Management Committee, has indicated that 
China will build a national rare earth resources strategic base in northern China. 
The basic plan is to store up all of the rare earth elements that were not used up 
from the annual excavation at Baosteel and use that to steady prices. As of 2008, 
a new rare earth industry base was being constructed in an effort to allow China 
to more efficiently regulate rare earth pricing and to guarantee its own future 
supply.97 
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Although there is insufficient evidence to substantiate the overall 
coordinator for this new policy initiative, it is likely to be the Chinese central 
government. As for who benefits and loses, all other factors equal, I would submit 
that creating a stockpile could raise rare earth prices due to increased demand. It 
is my assessment that this particular policy was implemented to stabilize rare 
earth pricing and provide future supplies to China.  
D. U.S. RESPONSES TO CHINA’S ACTIONS 
China’s recent actions in the rare earths market have raised several 
concerns about the country’s motives and intentions. One theory suggests that 
the state simply wants to mitigate the detrimental impacts of environmental 
degradation and promote the sustainment of future production and development 
of high-tech products. Another perspective sees the country utilizing its policies 
as a tool of economic statecraft. From a U.S. perspective, the following two 
quotes effectively portray Chinese intentions behind their recent rare earth policy 
actions: 
I am troubled by this recent turn of events and concerned that the 
world’s reliance on Chinese rare earth minerals, in combination with 
China’s apparent willingness to use this reliance for leverage in 
wider international affairs, poses a potential threat to American 
economic and national security interests.98    
– U.S. Representative Ed Markey 
The mantra in the U.S. ever since the late 1990s has been that 
globalization will make everybody rich. By being rich, they will 
become democratic. By being democratic, they will all be peaceful. 
Well, globalization is working in a somewhat different way. China is 
getting rich - and India is getting rich. But China’s not getting 
democratic. We’ve seen in the recent case of China embargoing 
the export of rare earths that it’s a kind of mercantilist economy. 
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The economy is being run for strategic purposes in ways that we 
didn’t anticipate.99   
– Clyde Prestowitz, former U.S. Trade Negotiator 
Although China has recently enacted several rare earth policies, its 
increased use of export restraints was the primary factor that led the international 
community, but particularly the United States, to initiate trade action against 
China. In September 2010, the United States first officially addressed China’s 
rare earth policies. Specifically the trade action included a Section 301 petition 
with the United States Trade Representative (USTR) by the United Steel, Paper 
and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service 
Workers International Union (AFL-CIO CLC (USW)). The primary export 
restrictions identified by the union included quotas, export duties and licensing 
procedures. In the petition, USW made the following claim:  
China’s reliance on WTO-inconsistent export restraints to dominate 
the world market in rare earth and other minerals not only nullifies 
and impairs benefits accruing to the United States under the WTO 
Agreement, it fundamentally distorts trade and competition in the 
green technology sector, among others.100  
Shortly after the initial petition, the USTR limited its investigation to cover only 
Chinese subsidies that were given to domestic manufacturers using components 
made in China instead of purchasing imports. In December 2010, USTR 
submitted a WTO dispute resolution case against China. China then removed 
these subsidies in February 2011.101 
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Subsequent to the initial petition, on March 13, 2012, President Obama 
announced that the United States, Japan, and the European Union (EU) would 
jointly file a formal case to the WTO against China imposing export quotas on its 
rare earths. In response to this WTO case, President Obama had the following 
words to say:  
Being able to manufacture advanced batteries and hybrid cars in 
America is too important for us to stand by and do nothing. We’ve 
got to take control of our energy future, and we can’t let that energy 
industry take root in some other country because they were allowed 
to break the rules.102 
Although not explicit, the above remarks encompass the view that China has and 
will continue to maintain control of its rare earth industry and engage in economic 
statecraft. Whether the United States likes it or not, China’s rare earth policies, 
especially its export restrictions, have had an affect on U.S. behaviors.  
But it is not just the United States government that feels as though China 
is engaging in economic statecraft by implementing specific policies that target 
the behaviors of international states. The EU stated earlier this year that China’s 
policies in rare earths mean “foreign buyers pay perhaps twice as much for rare 
earth materials as domestic ones.”103 According to the EU Trade Commissioner 
Karel De Gucht: “China’s restrictions on rare earths and other products violate 
international trade rules and must be removed. These measures hurt our 
producers and consumers in the EU and across the world, including 
manufacturers of pioneering hi-tech and ‘green’ business applications.”104 
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The above WTO dispute case is strikingly similar to a WTO case brought 
by the United States, EU, and Mexico against China in 2009, only then, as 
Morrison and Tang observe, the dispute involved export restrictions on raw 
materials.105 In this particular case, the restrictions in question included export 
quotas, export duties, export licensing, export price requirements, and export 
quota administration requirements on specific raw materials. Under this case the 
United States petitioned that Chinese policies intentionally lowered prices for 
Chinese firms in an effort to give them an unfair competitive advantage. USTR 
claimed that such export restrictions could 
artificially increase world prices for these raw material inputs while 
artificially lowering prices for Chinese producers. This enables 
China’s domestic downstream producers to produce lower-priced 
products from the raw materials and thereby creates significant 
advantages for China’s producers when competing against U.S. 
and other producers both in China’s market and other countries’ 
markets. The export restraints can also create substantial pressure 
on foreign downstream producers to move their operations and, as 
a result, their technologies to China.106 
As Morrison and Tang note, the results for China were nothing short of 
disastrous. In July 2011, a WTO panel ruled that China’s restriction on exports 
and duties on several raw materials violated its previously agreed upon WTO 
commitments. The panel stated that China’s Protocol of Accession formerly 
submitted to the WTO did not allow China to use certain provisions in WTO 
agreement to warrant its inconsistent trade restrictions. Furthermore, China failed 
to show how export restrictions were justified by reasons of non-replaceable 
natural resources. For instance, on the issue of non-replaceable materials, China 
could not demonstrate how it imposed similar restrictions on the production of 
domestic materials. Although China appealed the WTO panel’s ruling, on 
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January 30, 2012, a WTO Appellate Body did in fact affirm that China’s trade 
restrictions were in violation of WTO commitments.107   
In many ways the above case over Chinese raw materials was remarkably 
similar to the formal case that was filed with the WTO on March 13, 2012. First, 
both cases brought before the WTO were jointly filed with members from the 
international community. However, unlike in the earlier case where Mexico joined 
the United States and the EU, the most recent case involving rare earths had 
Japan as a vested representative. Second, both disputes involved near identical 
trade policies by China. For instance, although one case covered Chinese raw 
materials while the other dealt exclusively with rare earths, both argued Beijing 
was unfairly imposing export quotas, export duties and export licensing against 
its trading partners. Lastly, both cases claimed Chinese policies intentionally 
lowered prices for Chinese firms in an effort to give them an unfair competitive 
advantage.  Incentives such as Chinese subsidies were given to domestic 
manufacturers in both cases ultimately enabling China’s downstream producers 
to produce products at lower costs.108   
A specific case that arguably correlates with China’s intent to manage its 
rare earth policies as a tool for economic statecraft was observed in fall 2010. On 
September 8, 2010, a collision occurred between a Chinese fishing boat and two 
Japanese Coast Guard vessels within contested waters resulting in the arrest of 
a Chinese captain by Japanese authorities. As a result of this diplomatic dispute, 
China temporarily ceased high-level exchanges and begun halting rare earth 
exports to Japan. Although Japan agreed to release the Chinese captain, on 
October 19, 2010, the New York Times stated that China’s embargo of rare 
earths to Japan seemed to be still in effect and was possibly extended to the 
United States and the EU. Shortly thereafter, on November 19, 2010, the New 
York Times reported China’s resumption of rare earths to Japan but with some 
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delay. It is interesting to note that Chinese trade data depicts rare earth exports 
to Japan in October and November 2010 significantly lower from previous 
months, but rose substantially in December 2010.109  While by no measure does 
this incident prove Beijing utilizes its rare earth policies as a tool of economic 
statecraft, but it does provide some insight as to China’s anticipated behavior 
when conflicts arise.  
Although there are counter views surrounding the issue of China’s alleged 
efforts to use its control of rare earths as a tool of economic statecraft, the 
following quote clearly gives support to this notion: 
A Chinese government that is dangerously trigger-happy, willing to 
wage economic warfare on the slightest provocation....Couple the 
rare earth story with China’s behavior on other fronts - the state 
subsidies that help firms gain key contracts, the pressure on foreign 
companies to move production to China and, above all, that 
exchange-rate policy - and what you have is a portrait of a rogue 
economic superpower, unwilling to play by the rules.110 
A second case that points to China’s rare earth policies eliciting economic 
statecraft took place between China and Japan in fall 2011. In this case, China’s 
policies on rare earth exports reflected an attempt by Beijing to force foreign 
companies reliant on rare earths to move their production centers and technology 
to China in exchange for a low-cost supply of rare earths. In this example, 
Japanese business representatives were reportedly told by Chinese government 
officials to move their plants to China in exchange for a steady supply of rare 
earths. According to a Japanese publication, the Daily Yomiuri, a high-level 
delegation of Japanese officials visiting China in September 2011 was apparently 
told by the Chinese Vice Premier, Li Keqiang, that China wanted technological 
support from Japan in the rare earth industry.111 The following media reports 
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arguably present some evidence that Tokyo responded to alleged economic 
statecraft: 
Hitachi Metals, a major producer of high-powered magnets, 
reportedly indicated in August 2011 that it was contemplating 
moving production of some of its neodymium-based magnets to 
China.112 In September 2011, Toyota announced that it was 
planning to manufacture components (such as electric motors and 
batteries) for its hybrid cars in China, a move that some analysts 
speculated was motivated, in part, by Toyota’s desire to gain 
access to rare earths.113  
This technology initiatives policy or technology for resources strategy, 
referenced earlier in this chapter, fits very closely with Beijing’s goal of growing 
its rare earth industry to the more complex processing sectors. In fact, many of 
these policy measures seem to be part of a larger set of industrial policies China 
has initiated in an effort to become the world’s leader in technology and 
innovation.114 Even the local governments offer incentives to influence foreign 
companies such as the United States to move production facilities to China 
because they believe outside engagement would bring technology to resource 
rich regions.  
As evident by China’s rare earth policies, it is my assessment that its 
motives are predominantly mercantilist. To be sure, China does exhibit some 
degree of economic interdependence with the United States as both countries 
rely on one another in exchange of rare earths; however, when you analyze 
China’s true intentions, I believe the state is acting in its own interests. As noted 
by the above policy and evidenced in China’s National Medium-and Long-Term 
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Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020), which was 
released by China’s State Council in 2006, the country is principally interested in 
one objective - Modernizing the structure of its economy by transforming the 
country from a world center of low-tech manufacturing to one that is a dominant 
center of innovation by 2020 and a world innovation leader by 2050. China sees 
developing technologies for manufacturing rare earths as being a key priority for 
the country’s economic success.115 
 In the end, China’s strategy to push for technological development 
through restrictive export policies has brought tremendous concern to many 
foreign companies, particularly those in the United States. To U.S. firms, it seems 
Beijing is intentionally using its rare earth policies to lure foreign investment that 
would likely bring high-tech applications to Chinese companies needed to 
advance its down-stream rare earth sector.  
A final U.S. case on China’s utilization of rare earth policies involves 
observations noted by Keith Bradsher in The New York Times. He suggested 
that China’s rare earth policy detailing its consolidation efforts amounts to 
multiple state-owned mining companies who are in-turn buying up several 
smaller domestic mining firms. These actions or policy measures could enable 
what Bradsher refers to as a “state-owned rare earth oligopoly.”116 In other 
words, by creating such architecture, China would be able to limit rare earth 
exports without implementing government policies that direct the restrictions. As 
WTO rules generally cover government policies versus oligopolies, it will 
inevitably be much more difficult for the United States to win the latest rare earth 
case against China’s recent export restrictions on rare earths.117  
China’s rare earth policy emphasizing consolidation not only affects the 
geo-political international system but a newly formed oligopoly would also enable 
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the newly selected Chinese SOEs to influence rare earth prices and affect the 
position of its competitors including the small domestic mining firms. Under this 
new consolidation effort, the Chinese central government will likely benefit the 
most from these new policy measures, as it maintains the majority of equity in 
these businesses. Conversely, international overseas firms and domestic 
companies will ultimately suffer. It is my assessment that although Beijing clearly 
desires to modernize its economy through rare earth trade, it will not be at the 
expense of losing any control within its own central government.  
E. CHINA’S VIEW ON RARE EARTHS: DOMESTIC ISSUES CALL FOR 
NEW POLICIES 
In an effort to fully conceptualize why China attempts to use its rare earth 
policies as a tool of economic statecraft, it is crucial to first analyze the following 
problems within the industry:  environmental degradation, domestic consumption, 
smuggling and illegal mining activities, and excessive exploitation. Despite all of 
these problems being important, each issue addressed below is listed in order of 
precedence (i.e., most important / significant first) to justify China’s recent 
behavior. Specifically, by examining each of these problems it not only enables 
us to better understand China’s recent rare earth policy actions, but it also gives 
the international community including the United States a broader understanding 
of China’s long-term strategic intentions. Take for instance China’s most 
detrimental rare earth problem, environmental degradation. China knows full well 
that in order to compensate for the exorbitant environmental costs (i.e., pollution, 
health and safety, etc.) incurred through rare earth production, it must exercise 
certain measures that force the United States to lessen these expenses. 
Presently China bears the environmental costs for its international consumers; 
however, by engaging in economic statecraft, countries like the United States are 
compelled to either buy rare earths at considerably higher prices or are pushed 
to forego on this critical resource and thus help preserve China’s ecological 
environment and sustain any future production. 
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So why should the United States care about China’s problems?  If 
Washington actively seeks to identify, familiarize itself, and take sufficient steps 
to mitigate these obstacles, then Beijing would be less inclined to engage in 
economic statecraft by manipulating rare earth prices and more predisposed to 
allowing market forces control the industry. An example of active engagement 
might entail U.S. firms operating in China who willingly comply with Chinese 
government regulations in areas of safety and environmental measures. 
Conversely, if the United States failed to obey China’s domestic rare earth 
industry regulations, China would be more motivated to pursue policies that force 
international firms to offset the cost associated with sustaining rare earth 
production.  
The following material best illustrates the critical problems China currently 
faces within its own rare earth industry: 
1. Extreme Damage to the Ecological Environment 
Although each of the problems to be addressed are all serious matters the 
Chinese government must confront, I would submit that preventing extreme 
damage to the environment is by far the most pressing issue Beijing must 
overcome. A large concern behind China’s practice of mining rare earths is the 
negative impact it has on the environment due to poor mining practices. If not 
done correctly, there are a number of potential environmental implications to 
mining rare earths. Unfortunately due to large revenue potential, many Chinese 
rare earth mines have been operating illegally, with little regulation, causing 
excessive environmental problems.118 Chinese authorities would argue that 
outdated production processes and techniques in mining, dressing, smelting, and 
separating rare earth ores have greatly damaged vegetation, caused pollution, 
soil erosion, and reduced or possibly destroyed crop supplies. Mines with light 
rare earths frequently contain many associated metals, large quantities of 
hazardous gases, and wastewater with high concentrations of ammonium 
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nitrogen, and radioactive residues. Additionally, in some areas, excessive rare 
earth mining has contributed to landslides, contaminated waters, and even 
caused serious accidents affecting people’s safety, health, and the ecological 
environment.119  
The following quote by the Chinese Society of Rare Earths sufficiently 
illustrates the magnitude of waste generated from rare earths production: 
Every ton of rare earth produced, generates approximately 8.5 
kilograms (18.7 lbs) of fluorine and 13 kilograms (28.7 lbs) of dust; 
and using concentrated sulfuric acid high temperature calcination 
techniques to produce approximately one ton of calcined rare earth 
ore generates 9,600 to 12,000 cubic meters (339,021 to 423,776 
cubic feet) of waste gas containing dust concentrate, hydrofluoric 
acid, sulfur dioxide, and sulfuric acid, approximately 75 cubic 
meters (2,649 cubic feet) of acidic wastewater, and about one ton 
of radioactive waste residue (containing water).120   
Additionally, according to figures conducted within Baotou, China’s 
primary rare earth production location, all of the rare earth facilities in the region 
produce approximately 10 million tons of wastewater every year. Likewise, most 
of this wastewater generated is discharged into the environment without being 
effectively treated. This process not only contaminates potable water for daily 
living, but it also contaminates the surrounding water resources including 
irrigated farms.121 
Another factor that inevitably leads to poor mining practices and ultimately 
a damaged environment is the high cost associated with rare earth production. 
According to a representative of one Chinese factory in Baotou, Inner Mongolia, 
while companies will allocate some funds toward more environmentally friendly 
mining processes, others choose to keep those expenses at a minimum in order 
to maintain their competitive edge in the economic environment. Unfortunately, 
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the costs connected with environmental improvements are absorbed by the 
buyers. It is also worth noting that the land belongs to the government and not 
the individual mining factories. Thus, if a rare earth producer pays a significant 
sum of money for equipment or processes that are more environmentally friendly, 
that investment could be eliminated should the government decide to take back 
the land for any number of reasons. This consequently reduces the incentive to 
establish any type of environmental standards.122 
Even though China may have general pollution control standards, it has 
never truly implemented pollutant discharge standards for the rare earth industry. 
With the Chinese rare earth sector growing so rapidly, there has been no 
effective method to control the typical pollutants such as ammonium nitrogen and 
thorium dust, which emanate during the production state. Moreover, health and 
safety regulations are frequently overlooked for several reasons, including: 
- Large and complex industry that is often difficult to supervise; 
- Companies and leadership are generally not held accountable. For instance, in 
the United States, if an employee of a mining facility dies or suffers from 
environmental hazards, implications could entail a lawsuit or pension that the firm 
is obligated to render. In China, these regulations are often disregarded.123 
Arguably this problem is the most crucial to the longevity of China’s future 
sustainment of rare earths as its potential consequences are inevitably the most 
severe. For instance, if China were to continue to proceed down a path of 
outdated production processes and unregulated pollution control standards, 
environmental conditions could dramatically degrade leading to possible civil 
unrest throughout both rural and urban China. To be sure, the Chinese 
government can take domestic measures to protect the environment (i.e., 
Ministry of Land and Resources ended new licenses for rare earth production; 
establishing a national stockpile; Chinese state-owned companies invest 
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overseas; etc.),124 but it is more cost effective and efficient for Beijing to employ 
economic statecraft against its international trading partners. Instead of the 
Chinese central government spending vast resources and time in an attempt to 
regulate the rare earth industry, new policies can be implemented that impede 
international consumers from buying excessive quantities of rare earths (i.e., 
continue imposing rare earth export quotas). In the end, international companies 
like the United States would either be required to pay higher prices for rare earth 
imports or seek other alternatives. Either way, China could arguably offset huge 
environmental costs purely by pursuing economic statecraft. 
2. Domestic Consumption 
With nearly a quarter of the world’s population and arguably the most 
rapidly growing economy on earth, China is up against the challenge of ensuring 
it has sufficient rare earths to sustain economic development, while also faced 
with the task of appeasing the United States, which has been contesting China’s 
policy measures pertaining to rare earths. According to Wang Caifeng, China’s 
Deputy Director-General of the Materials Department of the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology, in 2008 China consumed 70,000 metric tons of rare 
earths with global demand estimated at 130,000 metric tons. China exported 
10,000 metric tons of rare earth magnets and over 34,000 metric tons of other 
rare earth products.125 
China’s consumption of rare earths is also expected to increase 
substantially as more and more U.S. firms relocate their production facilities to 
China to take advantage of lower rare earth prices and a reduction to their overall 
production costs. Some observers would argue that this strategy by China is 
designed to maintain a tight control on the overall industry.126  
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3. Smuggling 
Due to numerous circumstances, including domestic and international 
demand, the smuggling of rare earths to overseas markets continues to be an 
issue despite the efforts China’s customs have taken.127 According to China 
Business News, approximately 20,000 metric tons of rare earths were smuggled 
from China in 2008, which was assessed to have accounted for one third of the 
total volume of rare earths leaving China in that particular year. This illegal 
activity is often the primary reason behind the inaccuracies between the actual 
data and the official statistics of rare earth production and Chinese exports.128 
Smuggling inevitably keeps rare earth prices low and continues to reduce 
strategic resources. As a result, Beijing has implemented a nationwide 
enforcement on illegal mining activity since the second half of 2010.129 Beijing’s 
policies to tighten illegal mining activity ultimately enable fewer rare earths to be 
produced and subsequently exit the country. In the end, this policy action raises 
rare earth prices for international consumers, and forces states such as the 
United States to adopt new economic policies and giving China a competitive 
advantage.  
4. Excessive Exploitation of Rare Earth Reserves 
With over 50 years of extreme mining, China’s rare earth reserves have 
been decreasing and the number of years of assured rare earth supply is getting 
smaller.  The decline of rare earth resources throughout the dominant mining 
areas is accelerating, as most of the original resources are exhausted. In Baotou 
for instance, only one-third of the original volume of rare earths are available in 
the main mining locations. Unfortunately with so many mines spread throughout 
a large area, it becomes very difficult and costly to monitor their operation. As a 
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result, illegal mining has greatly reduced local resources, and mines that are 
abundant in reserves and easy to exploit are preferred over the others. This 
excessive exploitation ultimately results in a low recovery rate of the rare earth 
resources.130  Thus, to prevent over exploitation and maintain high rare earth 
recovery rates, China is encouraged to employ new policy actions intended to 
influence international actors or foreign firms operating in China over its domestic 
enterprises. This strategy would ultimately allow China to better meet its long-
term strategic economic interests as it could avoid allocating unnecessary 
expenses to its domestic industries. 
As mentioned earlier in this section, Beijing’s official position pertaining to 
its recently promulgated rare earth policies is to address environmental concerns 
in China and to better manage and conserve non-replaceable natural resources. 
With the many detrimental effects rare earth production causes and its ultimately 
limited supplies available, Beijing asserts that its perceived mercantilist policies 
are not intended to economically harm other countries but rather to ensure the 
safety of its own country and the assured sustainment of rare earth production for 
both Chinese citizens and the entire world.  
The following quote taken from Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech on 
October 7, 2010 best summarizes Beijing’s position on this issue: 
We haven’t imposed, and will not, impose an embargo on the 
industry. We are pursuing a sustainable development of the rare 
earth industry, not only to meet the demand of our own country, but 
also to cater to the needs of the whole world. We not only need to 
accommodate the current demand, but also, more significantly, 
need to take a long-term perspective. It is necessary to exercise 
management and control over the rare earth industry, but there 
won’t be any embargo. China is not using rare earth as a 
bargaining chip. We aim for the world’s sustainable 
development.131  
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With the WTO’s recent filing in March 2012 and the likelihood that the 
case will be referred to a WTO panel for ruling, Chinese rebuttals will most likely 
center on the environmental degradation argument as the WTO authorizes 
export restrictions on environmental grounds. Assuming present consultations fail 
between the United States and China, Beijing will also likely demonstrate that its 
policies emphasize measures relating to the sustainment of non-replaceable 
natural resources. Should the current consultations escalate to a WTO ruling, the 
United States will likely counter-argue by highlighting the upward trend of a 
Chinese rare earth production quota while the export quota is on a downward 
trend. In other words, the United States would submit that China is unfairly 
favoring its domestic enterprises over it foreign partners.132 China however, 
would submit that this contention is simply not the case. According to Inside US-
China Trade newsletter, China has recently implemented new policies involving 
domestic restrictions on rare earth mining. China asserted that these actions 
were taken for environmental purposes. The newsletter stated that the Chinese 
government made these recent restrictive measures not only to its rare earth 
exports, but also to limit new licenses required for rare earth mining by Chinese 
firms. The Chinese government also publically announced that new production 
limits would take effect regardless of the rare earth end use. Ultimately it did not 
matter whether the rare earths were being used for international or domestic 
purposes; all Chinese firms would receive these new production restrictions. 
Industry sources acknowledged that China had completely restructured its rare 
earth mining industry with the aim of mitigating environmental impact. As recently 
as last year, Beijing managed to close mining operations in order to come up with 
new licensing procedures and it consolidated the overall industry into a few 
conglomerates to better regulate the environmental impact.133  
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The Chinese government fully believes that it has done nothing wrong with 
regard to its rare earth policies. As noted by spokesman Liu Weimin, during a 
recent Foreign Ministry briefing, Chinese regulations are in full compliance with 
WTO rules. Despite enormous environmental pressure, Beijing has made it clear 
that it will continue to maintain rare earth exports throughout the international 
system.134 Likewise, even some WTO officials were opposed to U.S. complaints 
against China’s rare earth policies as WTO rules do not prohibit export duties 
and authorize trade restrictions for environmental protection purposes. 
Furthermore, Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
permits exceptions that are related to non-replaceable natural resources as well 
as limitations on supply.135 In China’s defense, most countries have export 
controls. According to a National Bureau of Asian Research special report 
published in 2011, Japan restricts the export of 208 various commodities, while 
U.S. export restrictions mainly center on arms and high-tech products. To that 
end, commodity exports under U.S. trade restrictions also requires a license 
issued by the International Trade Administration of the Department of 
Commerce. Many countries also place high duties on commodities. For instance, 
in Australia, export taxes on several natural resources are extremely high.136 
According to the Chinese government, in a recently published white paper, 
opening up is without question a fundamental national policy of China. In fact, 
Beijing clearly espouses concurrent consideration to both domestic and 
international resources, and publicly promotes a fair strategy that both ensures a 
rational supply of rare earths to the United States while also protecting the 
environment and resources. Beijing’s position is such that China will continue 
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with its initiatives in promoting equitable trade along with international exchanges 
and cooperation.137  
As indicated by the Chinese government, China will continue to provide 
rare earths to the international market. From Beijing’s perspective, the restrictive 
measures over rare earth exports put in place by the Chinese government are 
implemented in tandem with that of its mining efforts, production, and other 
aspects of the rare earth industry. According to China, these policy goals not only 
align with China’s sustainable production initiatives but are also in the interests of 
other countries in the world. As evident by their remarks, China wants to 
strengthen cooperation endeavors with other rare earth consumers and 
producers as well as bring solutions toward solving the ongoing environmental 
problems within the industry. China also desires for surrounding countries, 
including the United States, to make an effort to develop their own resources so 
the supply of rare earths can be expanded throughout the international 
environment. China claims to also be actively engaged in creating an open 
market for foreign investment, pushing for foreign participation in several areas 
including equipment manufacturing as well as the production of high-end 
application development.138 
In the realm of international cooperation, China has actively participated in 
many international exchanges pertaining to the rare earth industry. For example, 
it has repeatedly established the International Rare Earth Industry Summit, 
International Conference on Rare Earth Development and Application, and a few 
other forums for academic exchanges. China has also participated in programs 
held by the International Workshop on Rare Earth Permanent Magnets, the 
International Commission on Illumination and other similar international groups. 
Additionally, it has conducted both bilateral and multilateral exchanges and 
communication forums concerning rare earths with the United States, the EU, 
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Russian and Japan. In the eyes of China, the healthy development of the rare 
earth industry is absolutely critical to the sustainable use of rare earth reserves 
as vital natural resources of the world. With the understanding that all countries 
depend on one another for their own existence and wealth, Beijing professes that 
all states should not only enhance cooperation, but also to share responsibilities 
and accomplishments. Moreover, China promises to improve upon its rare earth 
policies, work tightly with international players to ensure a rational order of the 
rare earth market, and positively influence the word’s economic development 
through new technical innovations.139 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter began by introducing a key table highlighting seven major 
Chinese rare earth policy initiatives. By linking each of China’s rare earth policy 
actions with its respective policy authority, stated long-term goal and statecraft 
lever, China’s strategic intentions can be better measured. Moreover, by 
reviewing the evidence revealed by the three illustrative stories previously 
addressed in this chapter, I was able to assess that out of all seven policy 
initiatives, imposing export quotas had the greatest influence on the economic 
behavior of its domestic and international actors. Lastly, I assess that policies 
assigned higher statecraft lever points (i.e., export quotas) are more likely to be 
used by Beijing to attain their overall long-term strategic goals. 
Despite China becoming the largest rare earth reserve, consumer, 
producer and exporter, it has undoubtedly faced major problems including: 
environmental degradation, domestic consumption, smuggling activities, and 
overexploitation. Nonetheless, in order to adequately protect the rare earth 
industry, China has taken upon itself the decision to implement a series of 
policies designed not only to regulate rare earth production, but also to control 
the level of exports. Although all of the above disclosed policies provide insight 
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into China’s behavior, I would argue that it is Beijing’s imposition of export quotas 
that have exposed China’s true intentions. 
In sum, this study did reveal modest signs indicating Beijing’s necessity to rely on 
economic interdependence through its participation in various rare earth forums 
and exchanges. Likewise, its national position to promote equitable trade of rare 
earths via the international market does suggest a moderate level of cooperation. 
However, based upon the data provided in the above stories, it is my contention 
that Beijing’s rare earth policies point more toward economic statecraft. Although 
Beijing would never openly admit such a practice, its efforts to control the market 
via these policies in order to enhance its own economic development and growth 
demonstrate economic statecraft. (as illustrated by table 3 at the beginning of this 
chapter) With Beijing’s virtual monopoly in rare earths, it fully knows that by 
imposing export quotas, other countries such as the United States will be 
compelled to move their hi-tech manufacturing facilities to China in order to 
access critical rare earths at low cost. The United States may receive access to 
the rare earth market, but it is China that ultimately comes out on top as its 
industry will capitalize on new technologies and innovations that modernize the 
structure of its economy.  
 In the end, China’s ability to utilize its rare earth policies as a tool of economic 
statecraft will give the country an edge within the industry at least in the near-
term.  
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After successfully developing a comparative framework of China’s rare 
earth element (REE) policies by using two prominent international relations 
theories (structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism) and applying its 
economic behavior to these theories, I was able to conclude, on balance, that 
China is indeed employing an economic statecraft approach to the sector. 
Furthermore, by building a detailed analytical narrative of China’s rare earth 
element policies through qualitative comparative analysis, I was able to identify 
several key strategic consequences of China’s behavior in REEs. Thus, the aim 
of answering to what extent China is using its rare earth element policies as a 
tool of economic statecraft was fulfilled.  
The purpose of this conclusion is threefold: (1) address critical key 
findings; (2) offer some insight as to what type of rising power China will be; and 
(3) detail various strategic implications for the United States. 
B. KEY FINDINGS 
First, although Beijing has and will continue to utilize its rare earth policies 
as a tool of economic statecraft, it will do so rather cautiously. To be sure, 
China’s capabilities in economic power are continually expanding along with its 
effectiveness in choosing from a large selection of economic statecraft policy 
options; however, its present reliance on broad economic interdependence with 
the United States often checks its leverage in exercising economic power. Put 
differently, despite China’s recently growing economic power and influence, it is  
economically interdependent on international actors such as the United States. 
Whether China has or will ever openly admit it, Beijing’s continued economic 
growth and development is heavily dependent on free market economic trade 
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with its international actors. Nevertheless, China has not recently engaged in any 
sort of free trade or fair access within its rare earth’s industry. In fact, the only 
evidence to date that suggests any degree of interdependence involves the 
Chinese government’s willingness to cooperate with the United States by offering 
its assistance in recycling rare earths and developing valuable substitutes. 
Beyond this one area, China has done nothing to prove it is a cooperative partner 
within the rare earth industry. China is simply not employing sufficient economic 
coordination or cooperation within the REE sector to justify an interdependent 
approach.  
Consequently, if we re-examine the evidence presented in chapter 4, 
specifically Table 3, one can see that all seven of China’s rare earth policy 
actions elicit some degree of economic statecraft. Take for example, the Chinese 
government’s 2008 implementation to initiate new regulations ensuring greater 
control over the rare earth industry. With China’s Ministry of Land and Resources 
(MLR) issuing the Guidelines for Development of National Mineral Resources 
2008-2015, China’s rare earth industry was deliberately being protected and its 
exploitation and production restricted. This government controlled directive 
enabled Beijing to not only protect its rare earth industry, but also to influence the 
behaviors of both domestic and international (principally U.S.) actors. Similarly, 
Beijing’s efforts to impose rare earth export quota, licenses and / or duties on 
international and domestic firms also demonstrated the use of policy as effective 
tools of economic statecraft. Imposing export quotas on these entities proved to 
be the most effective statecraft lever as this tool arguably had the largest 
influence on economic behavior of all the stated policy actions. Whether it was a 
Chinese domestic firm or a U.S. rare earth corporation purchasing these 
restricted resources, Beijing succeeded in attaining substantial economic profits 
and ultimately was able to promote its national objective.  
Second, Beijing has been successful in utilizing its rare earth policies as a 
tool of economic statecraft by both influencing the behavior of international actors 
and through deliberate interaction with its domestic rare earth organizations. The 
 85
first illustrative story captured in this study involving a Chinese embargo on rare 
earth shipments to Japan clearly illustrates China’s ability to exercise its soft 
power capabilities in order to achieve Chinese strategic interests. By employing 
this particular rare earth policy, Beijing successfully managed to influence the 
economic behavior of a targeted international actor. China’s policy actions in this 
instance not only compelled an international actor to relinquish the captured 
Chinese fishermen, but it also affected Japan’s economic behavior as this 
needed resource was made temporarily unavailable.  Similarly, story two also 
involved international actors; however, in this instance, Beijing used the 
technology for resource policy as a tool of economic statecraft. In other words, 
the Chinese government successfully influenced the economic behavior of 
Japanese business representatives by forcing Japanese firms reliant on rare 
earths to move their production centers and technology to China. This form of 
economic statecraft not only enabled China to establish a relative economic gain 
over Japan but it also empowered China to strengthen its long-term economic 
power. By exercising its rare earth policies, China is able to attain foreign 
technology, and build-out and serve its domestic rare earth manufacturing 
industry. In the end, China’s goal of exporting value added materials can be 
achieved which ultimately leads to China’s national objective of modernizing the 
structure and magnitude of its economy. Alternatively, story three exposes 
China’s ability to manipulate the economic activities of its domestic industrial rare 
earth partners. Specifically, the Chinese government leveraged its economic 
power by imposing the Industry Consolidation policy against both private rare 
earth firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). By implementing a 
consolidation policy, Chinese SOEs will maintain the majority of capabilities to 
economically influence rare earth prices of all remaining domestic mining firms. 
Although the consolidation initiative has not completely taken effect, it is my 
assessment that these policies will affect U.S. firms operating in China and 
Chinese privately owned companies the most. In the end, these policies will allow 
the Chinese central government to regulate REE trade and ultimately set prices.  
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Third, although Beijing expresses the desire to deepen its integration with 
the global economy through the continual use of rare earth policies, it will not be 
at the expense of losing any control within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
The CCP knows full well that it cannot exert too much pressure on its domestic 
rare earth industry corporations (i.e., exercising overly harsh rare earth policies) 
without experiencing some type of social unrest. For instance, should the CCP 
impose excessive rare earth quotas on its domestic firms, internal opposition 
would likely occur potentially forcing leadership members to resign. However, 
with the upcoming rare earth consolidation initiative underway and the majority of 
the industry being subordinated to SOEs, the Chinese central government will be 
better able to maintain its legitimacy, influence economic behavior, and ultimately 
modernize the structure of its economy through aggressive rare earth policy 
actions. In the end, China’s political elites encourage state economic success, 
but not without maintaining their own autocracy and legitimacy within the 
government. 
Finally, despite the many conditions for determining China’s effectiveness 
in economic statecraft, I submit, following Norris, that it is the ability of the 
Chinese government to structure its rare earth element sector and direct its 
domestic enterprises that matter the most. China has clearly wielded its 
economic policies on the United States in order to attain national interests, but 
the true measure of weighing China’s effectiveness in economic statecraft lies in 
its ability to control domestic economic interaction.140 Evidence of this strategy 
involved China offering various incentives to its domestic partners in order to 
achieve its national strategic objectives. In the context of this study, specific 
incentives entailed the state waiving licensing fees or duties to domestic rare 
earth firms while forcing these expenses on U.S. firms.  Another example 
correlates to each of the two previously mentioned World Trade Organization 
(WTO) cases. In both cases, Chinese rare earth policies intentionally lowered 
prices for Chinese firms in an effort to give them an unfair competitive advantage. 
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In either instance, China was able to affect the economic behavior of the United 
States through the direct control of its domestic actors.  
C. CHINA’S RISE: NATIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
As evident by its recent belligerent behavior over the past few years, 
China has arguably become difficult for the world to handle. For example, Beijing 
has recently exhibited increasingly aggressive behavior toward its neighbors in 
Asia given the vast natural resources available in the South China Sea. 
Moreover, its relations in Africa and Latin America have also become somewhat 
strained as it seeks additional resources to sustain its growing energy demand. 
With Beijing’s gradual expansion and continual economic rise in the global 
economy, many observers are wondering how long its new boldness will last. Is 
this observed behavior temporary or are we inclined to see China exhibit this 
abrasive identity indefinitely?141 
Although China’s foreign policies often exhibit a multitude of competing 
identities, I believe its core international identity is primarily understood through a 
realist school of thought. Like Chinese Realists, I believe China honors the 
nation-state while also emphasizing the principle of state sovereignty. Similarly, I 
envision China mostly dismissing the international environment while 
concurrently placing a great deal of emphasis on building up its own state.  In the 
future, I perceive China as a state that will find its own way in the world while also 
resisting outside pressures. Taking an offensive realist perspective, I argue that 
China has and will continue to use its recently attained economic influence to 
compel international actors such as the United States to react in a manner that 
meets Beijing’s long-term strategic objectives.142  
In the context of this study, China will leverage its near-monopoly on the 
rare earths industry by continuing to aggressively employ policies that meet its 
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strategic intention. With China’s recent employment of its rare earth policies, 
particularly technology for resources, China will ultimately produce value-added 
products and become a major exporter of advanced technology. In 10 to 20 
years, it is likely China will impose even more restrictive policies that undermine 
the United States and benefit China. In my mind, the term “peaceful rise” is a 
threatening theory because it conveys to potential adversaries a message that 
China will not act aggressively to defend its national sovereignty or strategic 
interests. I believe China is dissatisfied with the state of U.S.-China relations and 
believes that its future relationship is not in good standing. If China does not 
oppose the United States through its foreign policy tools, the United States will 
simply subvert China’s strategic interests.143  However, with the advent of such 
bold policies, China can sustain high prices on rare earths, attain needed high-
technology, and mitigate many of the negative effects on environmental 
degradation.  
As evident by China’s recent rare earth policy actions, the state has 
become an increasingly realist, self-interested nation that seeks to promote its 
own nationalistic sentiments and economic development. Despite the many 
reasons that have driven this tendency, I believe China’s environmental 
challenges, technological needs and desire to maximize its economic 
development contribute the most. In the end, Beijing’s recent behavior in its rare 
earth policy actions suggest China will likely seek greater economic power, more 
assertive global power, and ultimately become a less cooperative international 
partner.144 Beijing will involve itself in international affairs, but only when it 
benefits China. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA 
Given the above international identity of China, one might suggest that the 
United States should respond with a realist approach. For instance, in the context 
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of this study, the United States would find it favorable to impose aggressive trade 
policies against China.  But in reality this method would likely be counter-
productive.  Should the United States counter with a realist response, it would 
only prolong the existing security dilemma in U.S.-China relations or worse 
produce an adversarial relationship that neither state desires. In fact, aggressive 
U.S. policy actions would only fuel Chinese nationalism, and make it even more 
challenging to collaborate with China globally. Stringent U.S. economic policies 
may seem sensible as these measures attempt to reduce trade barriers; 
however, overly aggressive U.S. actions could easily cause China to counter 
U.S. actions and ultimately create a trade war.145    Take for example the 
previously referenced March 13, 2012 jointly filed case between the United 
States, Japan and the European Union (EU) to the WTO against China for 
imposing export quotas on its rare earths. To be sure, these institutional systems 
do provide a forum for arbitration, but if taken too far, these international 
organizations will only further deteriorate current relations with China. So what 
alternatives are there for dealing with China’s abrasive rare earth policy actions 
apart from the current WTO dispute resolution case?  What if the United States 
were to encourage China to allow foreign companies to mine rare earths in China 
if such firms helped to improve environmental mining conditions in China in 
exchange for a guarantee that a certain percentage of rare earths could be 
exported?146 As China claims this is a major factor behind its rare earth policies, 
this proposition would not only help the United States attain essential rare earths, 
but it would also mitigate much of China’s environmental degradation problems. 
Nevertheless, rather than taking a standard realist response toward China’s 
recent rare earth policy actions, I believe its critical for Washington to implement 
a more complex strategy in order to tackle Beijing’s recent actions.147  
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E. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 
Although there are many solutions to address the nearly total U.S. 
dependence on Chinese rare earths, I agree with Valerie Grasso in assessing 
the following four options as having the greatest impact for securing a source for 
rare earths and addressing U.S. national security interests:  create new rare 
earth stockpiles for defense purposes; identify alternatives to rare earths; provide 
additional financial assistance for rare earth production within the United States; 
and establish partnerships with foreign allies capable of supplying rare earths.148 
1. Defense Related Stockpiling  
Grasso’s first recommendation is for the U.S. congress to mandate a 
strategic REEs stockpile. By creating such strategic reserves, these stockpiles 
could increase the security of the domestic U.S. supply for rare earths.149  
According to the United States Magnetic Materials Association (USMMA), a trade 
organization dedicated to restoring an end-to-end supply chain of rare earth 
permanent magnets: 
This strategic stockpile would ensure our Department of Defense 
has ready access to those materials needed to ensure our national 
security and to incentivize the return of domestic manufacturing. 
With defense critical materials such as dysprosium being sourced 
solely from China, it is critical that the Department of Defense have 
access to rare earth oxides from reliable producers and 
manufacturers in the United States and ally nations to perform 
value added processes, such as metal, alloy and magnet 
manufacturing.150 
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2. Rare Earth Alternatives  
Another possible U.S. option to securing a source for rare earths could 
include reducing Department of Defense (DoD) consumption of rare earth 
elements by identifying and attaining equally effective alternatives to rare earths. 
Although attaining rare earth substitutes for the DoD industry might be difficult as 
specific rare earth elements are often necessary to manufacture defense critical 
weapon systems, additional research and development efforts could discover 
new rare earth-free materials required by DoD.151  
3. Rare Earth Research Funding 
With the strategic significance of rare earths expanding, and the need to 
augment rare earth research and development, it is essential to consider the 
benefits in funding rare earth application sciences, particularly in curriculums for 
military and other government organizations intended to train young students and 
scientists.152  This new research and development will not only make the U.S. 
rare earth industry more sophisticated but its advancements in rare earth 
production will ultimately lessen the burden of U.S. dependence on China.  
4. Foreign Ally Partnerships  
Another option for the United States given the near total dependence on 
rare earths from China would be to aggressively pursue joint ventures with other 
nations. By actively engaging in partnerships with foreign allies, the United States 
can better assure its likelihood of securing the needed rare earths for its defense 
industry. The only potential downside to this option includes the sourcing used by 
these partner nations. For instance, should the U.S. DoD rely on an ally for rare 
earth metals, and that nation attain its oxides from China, this partnership may 
not provide the necessary security of supply.153 Although, in the end, the more 
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available sources the United States can acquire internationally, the less likely 
China can use its rare earth policies as a tool of economic statecraft.  
F. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: RENEWED RELATIONS WITH CHINA 
Despite the aggressive posture China has taken with the United States 
through its REE policies, if the U.S. is to remain a vibrant twenty first century 
economic power it must also maintain close cooperation between and among 
developed nations such as China. Due to the interdependent nature of the global 
economy, the United States, like other nations, is dependent upon overseas 
markets to not only sell its exports but also to maintain its access to scarce 
commodities and resources like REEs. As a result, we are likely to see the 
United States maintain an enduring relationship with China, but only to secure its 
current position as the world’s global hegemon.  
As for China, “few countries are poised to have more impact on the world 
over the next 15-20 years than China. If current trends persist, by 2025 China will 
have the world’s second largest economy and will be a leading military power.”154  
Nevertheless, the pace of China’s economic growth rates will likely slow or 
possibly recede, as the nation will undoubtedly be faced with social pressures 
arising from income disparities, a decaying social safety net, faulty business 
regulation, energy demands, and environmental degradation. Although much of 
China’s economic growth is and will continue to be domestically driven, certain 
key sectors such as rare earths depend on international markets and foreign 
acquired technology. As such, China’s economic growth and development is 
ultimately affected by other countries, particularly the United States.155 If China 
truly desires to maintain unprecedented growth rates and continue to modernize 
the structure of its economy, then it must relinquish its current behavior tied to 
rare earth policies and employ free trade and fair access with its global partners. 
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